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OBVIOUS BUT NOT CLEAR: THE RIGHT TO 
REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH THE 
POLICE DURING A TERRY STOP 
SAM KAMIN* AND ZACHARY SHIFFLER** 
This Article answers a question that has confounded the lower federal courts: 
whether a suspect briefly detained under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio is obligated 
to answer police questions posed to her. Although the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly found a right to remain silent during a Terry stop, it has, through 
dicta, concurrences, and elsewhere, consistently assumed the existence of such a 
right. Nonetheless, more than fifty years after Terry was decided, lower federal 
courts consistently deny recovery to those who allege they were wrongfully arrested 
for refusing to answer police questions. Interestingly, these courts rarely reject 
outright the existence of a right to silence in the Terry context. Rather, they simply 
find that because such a right is not clearly established, officers who arrest suspects 
for refusing to answer their questions are entitled to qualified immunity. 
The unwillingness of courts to recognize a right to silence in the Terry context is 
inconsistent not just with the Court’s repeated pronouncements on the subject but also 
with the Court’s broader conception of the right to remain silent. Those who have not 
been seized by law enforcement officers have an absolute right to ignore police questions 
and go about their business; this is in many ways the definition of what it means to 
be at liberty. And when one is under arrest, the right to silence is so important that a 
confession is irrebuttably presumed to be coerced under Miranda v. Arizona unless 
the defendant is apprised of that right and has made a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver of it. It makes no sense that only those in between those two 
categories—those who have been briefly detained but not yet arrested—have no right 
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to remain silent in the face of police questioning. And yet we can find no lower court 
that has acknowledged the existence of a broad right to silence in the Terry context. 
We suggest three solutions to this problem. First, lower federal courts should simply 
acknowledge that the right exists and is clearly established by Supreme Court 
precedent. Having done so, they should award money damages against officers who 
arrest suspects simply for refusing to answer questions put to them during a Terry 
stop. Second, if courts are unwilling to find this clearly established right in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, then they should themselves establish that such a 
right exists. The newly announced right will be clearly established for later cases and 
will allow recovery for future litigants, if not for the plaintiff in the case establishing 
the rule. Finally, we encourage state courts and legislatures to determine, as a matter 
of state law, that their statutes permitting arrest for obstruction of justice or interfering 
with a police officer are not violated by the mere refusal to answer police questioning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2015, New Jersey state patrol officers pulled over Rebecca 
Musarra on Route 519 near the Delaware border.1 Musarra, an 
attorney, provided her license and registration to the officers but 
otherwise sat mutely behind the wheel as they asked her if she knew 
why they had pulled her over. The dashboard video of the incident 
shows that the officers became increasingly frustrated with Musarra’s 
refusal to answer their questions and that they eventually informed her 
that they would arrest her if she did not cooperate. Musarra expressly 
asserted her right not to answer any questions but was nonetheless 
arrested on charges of obstruction of justice under New Jersey law. After 
a brief detention, Musarra was neither formally charged with a crime 
nor issued a summons to appear in court. She eventually sued the 
officers for violating her constitutional rights, and the state settled her 
case for $30,000. In doing so, the state neither admitted wrongdoing nor 
provided Musarra with the apology she had requested.2 
It would be easy enough to write off the Musarra incident, as a state 
patrol spokesperson did,3 as simply a matter of insufficient officer 
training. However, the federal courts have been extremely unreceptive 
to most litigants who find themselves in Musarra’s position. This is 
surprising. More than fifty years ago, Justice White wrote in his Terry v. 
Ohio4 concurrence that while the police may briefly detain members of 
the public for investigative purposes based on reasonable suspicion, 
“[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may 
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an 
arrest.”5 Yet what seemed obvious to Justice White seems far less clear 
to federal trial and appellate courts today. Time and again, courts have 
found the law in this area sufficiently unsettled to deny recovery to 
those alleging that they were unconstitutionally arrested for refusing 
to cooperate with police investigations. 
The unwillingness of courts to recognize a right to silence in the 
Terry context is inconsistent not just with the Court’s repeated 
pronouncements on the subject but also with the Court’s broader 
conception of the right to remain silent. Those who have not been 
1. S.P. Sullivan, NJ State Troopers Arrested Her for Staying Silent. Now the State Will
Pay., NJ.COM (Aug 23, 2017), https://www.nj.com/politics/2017/08/ nj_pays_ 
30k_to_woman_arrested_for_staying_silent_d.html [https://perma.cc/3F25-GH8K]. 
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
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seized by law enforcement officers have an absolute right to ignore police 
questions and go about their business; this is, in many ways, the definition 
of what it means to be at liberty. When one is under arrest, the right to 
silence is so important that a confession is irrebuttably presumed to be 
coerced unless the defendant is apprised of that right and has made a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of it. It makes no sense that only 
those in between those two categories—those who have been briefly 
detained but not yet arrested—have no right to remain silent in the face 
of police questioning. Yet, no lower court has acknowledged the existence 
of a broad constitutional right to silence in the Terry context. 
This Article discusses the constitutional rights possessed by, and the 
obligations a state may impose upon, a person subject to a brief 
investigative Terry stop. It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief 
background of the various constitutional rights and procedural rules 
that intersect and overlap in the context of police questioning during 
brief investigative stops.6 We demonstrate that a long history of 
statements from the Supreme Court—in dicta, concurrences, and 
dissents—make clear, although never explicit, that there is no 
obligation to cooperate with police questioning during a Terry stop. 
Part II discusses the litigation of this issue in the lower federal courts. 
We show that, notwithstanding the Court’s relative clarity on this point, 
lower courts generally rely on the absence of a single, clear precedent 
to deny recovery to those claiming a constitutional injury. Because 
these suits generally arise as civil actions against the investigating 
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts are able to avoid reaching the 
constitutional claim by finding for defendants on the basis of qualified 
immunity. Unsettled law leads to a finding of qualified immunity, 
which obviates the need to clarify the law. 
Part III suggests a way forward. Currently, litigation of these cases 
often results in an endless cycle of undeclared law and victory for 
government officials, notwithstanding all of the evidence pointing to a 
right to refuse to answer police questions during a Terry stop. Our 
proposed solution to this problem is threefold. First, the Supreme 
Court’s opinions make clear, although admittedly not explicit, that a 
person subject to a Terry stop is not obligated to provide the police any 
information other than his name. Lower federal courts considering 
such a claim should conclude that a right exists and is clearly 
established, permitting compensation for those who have been wrongly 
 
 6. Although this issue seems to arise principally in car stops, we see no reason why 
the same rules should not apply as well to street encounters and other species of brief 
investigative stops. See infra Part I.A.5 (describing the three “levels” of police stops). 
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arrested for their silence. Second, to the extent courts find the law on 
this point to be unclear at the moment, they should create such clarity by 
announcing that there is a right not to cooperate with police questioning 
during Terry stops. While such a finding may not benefit the plaintiff 
before the court—because the right was not clearly established at the time 
the officers in her case acted—it will make the content of the law clear to 
individuals and law enforcement officials in the future and will make 
recovery available for later plaintiffs. Finally, if federal courts will not act, 
the state courts and legislatures should. States should make clear that 
obstruction of justice statutes, like the one Musarra allegedly violated at 
the time of her arrest, require more than verbal noncooperation to 
establish probable cause to arrest. If it is clear as a matter of state law that 
failure to answer police questions cannot be grounds for arrest, officers 
will be stripped of their qualified immunity when they do so. 
I.    THE RELEVANT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DOCTRINES 
As we demonstrate more fully below, courts tend to find the law 
unsettled with regard to whether an individual briefly stopped by the 
police for investigation is obligated to answer the officers’ questions. 
One of the reasons for this confusion is that police questioning in this 
context occurs at the intersection of a number of related but distinct 
constitutional rights. Those alleging a constitutional violation when 
arrested for refusing to cooperate with police questioning often allege 
violations of their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights.7 In this 
Section, we discuss each of the relevant rights and their interactions, 
demonstrating that, at least with regard to the Fourth Amendment, the 
right to silence during Terry stops is clearly established. Furthermore, 
and perhaps equally importantly, we demonstrate that procedural and 
remedial rules for the adjudication of these rights often conspire to 
prevent a clear resolution of the rights at issue. 
A.   Constitutional Law 
Much of the confusion regarding the right to remain silent during a 
police stop follows from the overlapping and interconnected 
constitutional principles that govern police-citizen interactions. This 
Subsection discusses the Fourth, Fifth, and First Amendment rights 
that apply to these incidents, demonstrating how the interrelated 
nature of these rights has confounded courts in this area. 
 
 7. See infra Sections II.A–C (describing plaintiffs’ causes of action in three 
exemplary cases as based in violations of those three Constitutional amendments). 
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1. The Fourth Amendment and Terry stops 
The Fourth Amendment plays a major role in regulating how police 
officers may interact with members of the public.8 Although the Fourth 
Amendment’s text is hardly a model of clarity,9 the Supreme Court has 
generally read it to create certain baseline rules to regulate police 
conduct. First, the Amendment is seen as creating a preference for 
warrants issued by neutral and detached magistrates.10 That is, the 
Court has read the Amendment as a check on officer discretion, 
generally requiring officers in the field to seek and receive the 
approval of a magistrate before they may deprive individuals of their 
liberty.11 Second, even in those situations that do not require a warrant, 
the Court has stated that searches and seizures are presumptively 
unconstitutional in the absence of probable cause.12 Thus, for 
example, police must have a warrant before entering a private home 
 
 8. The Fourth Amendment states in full, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in 
Defining the Fourth Amendment, 26 B.C. L. REV. 83, 89 (2004) (“[A]t its most fundamental 
levels—the relationship between the Amendment’s two clauses and the degree of 
suspicion that must be shown before a warrantless search may be conducted—it 
becomes clear that the Fourth Amendment is hardly self-defining.”). 
 10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967) (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (“‘[T]his Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] 
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)). 
 11. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1989) (“An 
essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring 
citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary 
acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by 
law, and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. A warrant also provides the 
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination 
whether an intrusion is justified in any given case.” (citations omitted)). 
 12. As the phrase “probable cause” appears only in the warrant clause of the Fourth 
Amendment, there is reason to question the wisdom of this presumption. For a critique 
of essentially all of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (“The 
Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. . . . Warrants are not required—unless 
they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded in probable cause—but not on 
Tuesdays.”). For Amar, the Fourth Amendment is primarily about reasonableness, not the 
various presumptions the Court has created over the years. Id. at 759. 
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to make an arrest or to search.13 But, if they have probable cause, 
officers may make an arrest in a public space14 or search a car even 
without a warrant.15 
a. Terry stops 
The Court’s presumption in favor of probable cause as a 
constitutional requirement is also subject to a number of significant 
exceptions. Principally, for present purposes, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court 
announced that police officers may briefly detain and frisk individuals 
based upon the lower standard of reasonable suspicion. Officer Martin 
McFadden observed Terry and two other men who he believed were 
casing a jewelry store in downtown Cleveland, Ohio.16 His suspicions 
aroused, the officer approached the men and asked for their names. 
When the men “mumbled something” in response to the officer’s 
questions, McFadden grabbed Terry and patted him down. When 
McFadden felt a handgun in Terry’s coat, he removed it. He also 
patted down Terry’s two confederates, removing another handgun 
from one. He then arrested all three men. 
At his trial for unlawful possession of a weapon, Terry challenged the 
state’s introduction of the handgun into evidence, and the Supreme 
Court eventually upheld McFadden’s search and seizure of Terry and 
his confederates. The Court held that an officer may stop and briefly 
 
 13. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). 
 14. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1976). 
 15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
It is fair to criticize the Court for applying both of these presumptions quite loosely. 
As Justice Scalia has written, the exceptions have largely come to swallow the rule. 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Even before 
today’s decision, the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions 
that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged nearly 20 
such exceptions, including ‘searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . . 
border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent 
circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to 
arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory 
searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es]. . . .’ ”). In fact, despite the Court’s 
presumption language, the vast majority of interactions between law enforcement and 
the public take place without the benefit of either a warrant or probable cause. 
 16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1968). Although it is not a part of the Court’s 
opinion, it is clear that the racial make-up of the three men was part of what caught 
the officer’s attention. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and 
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 957, 967 (1999) (“In his suppression hearing 
testimony, the officer made a point of referring to the race of each of the participants 
when he described their contact with each other. The interracial nature of the group 
apparently also ‘didn't look right’ to the detective.” (footnote omitted)). 
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detain an individual he reasonably suspects of criminal activity17 and may 
frisk a detainee he reasonably believes to be armed and presently 
dangerous.18 For the first time, the Supreme Court upheld a search and 
seizure carried out on the basis of less than the probable cause that 
would be necessary to arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Although 
the dissent written by Justice Douglas critiqued the Court for authorizing 
a search that no magistrate could authorize,19 the majority was clearly 
influenced by the realities faced by law enforcement officers in the field. 
McFadden did essentially what society might expect of police officers in 
his situation; he acted based on his experience and observations to stop 
a crime before it was committed. Moreover, he used a graduated 
approach, confirming his suspicions and conducting a limited search for 
weapons before escalating the situation to a full custodial arrest. 
In an unusually self-conscious move, the Court acknowledged in Terry 
that it was handing law enforcement a powerful tool, one that would 
be easy for them to misuse.20 To limit the potential for abuse of the 
Terry stop, the Court has held in Terry and elsewhere that such stops 
must be carefully circumscribed: they must be valid both at their 
inception and in their scope.21 The former limitation requires the 
 
 17. Id. at 22 (“[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal 
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”). 
 18. Id. at 29 (“The sole justification of [a Terry search] is the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an 
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden 
instruments for the assault of the police officer.”). 
 19. Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate 
would . . . have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a showing 
of ‘probable cause.’ We hold today that the police have greater authority to make a 
‘seizure’ and conduct a ‘search’ than a judge has to authorize such action. We have 
said precisely the opposite over and over again.”). 
 20. Id. at 15 (majority opinion) (“Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating 
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our 
decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police 
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security 
without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When 
such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary, and its fruits must 
be excluded from evidence in criminal trials. And, of course, our approval of legitimate 
and restrained investigative conduct undertaken on the basis of ample factual 
justification should in no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the 
exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove inappropriate.”). 
 21. Id. at 19–20 (“[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were 
‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at 
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.”). 
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police to articulate more than a hunch before they may briefly stop an 
individual—they must point to specific and articulable facts that support 
their reasonable suspicion that the suspect was engaging in, or about to 
engage in, criminal activity.22 In addition, before he may frisk, the officer 
must reasonably believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.23 
The restriction on scope limits the way a properly initiated Terry stop 
may be carried out. For example, although the Court has held that an 
individual may be removed from a car for a Terry stop24 and that a drug-
sniffing dog may be walked around his vehicle during such a stop,25 an 
individual may be detained only so long as is necessary to effectuate 
the investigation.26 More generally, the Court has maintained that 
officers must move efficaciously during a Terry stop and that, at some 
point, a stop becomes so involved or drawn out that it is tantamount to 
an arrest and must be supported by probable cause.27 
One issue regarding the scope of a Terry stop that the Court has not 
directly addressed—the central question of this Article—is whether an 
individual is obligated to answer police officer questions during the 
course of a Terry stop.28 Recall that part of what concerned Officer 
McFadden, and what led to the arrests of his suspects, was their inability 
to identify themselves and explain their suspicious behavior to him. 
Justice White, who joined the Court’s Terry opinion and thus presumably 
 
 22. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“Terry created a 
limited exception to [the] general rule: certain seizures are justifiable under the 
Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime.”). 
 23. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“So long as the officer is entitled 
to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and 
dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective 
purpose.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047–48 (1983) (“[P]olice may order persons 
out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation . . . .”). 
 25. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained 
narcotics-detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate 
legitimate privacy interests.”). 
 26. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1985). 
 27. Id. at 686 (explaining that the relevant inquiry in assessing a traffic stop’s 
duration is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary 
to detain the defendant”). 
 28. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–87 (2004) 
(questioning whether a suspect who declined to provide identification during a Terry 
stop may constitutionally be arrested under a state statute requiring him to provide 
such identification). 
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agreed with it in whole, felt compelled to write separately in that case to 
clarify a matter not directly addressed by the Court’s opinion: 
[A]lthough the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this 
case, I think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of 
interrogation during an investigative stop. There is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions 
to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person 
approached may not be detained or frisked, but may refuse to 
cooperate and go on his way. However, given the proper 
circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person 
may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are 
directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers 
may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, 
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.29 
Justice White’s concurrence—mentioned by none of the other 
opinions in Terry—was meant to clarify what he saw as a truism 
contained in the Court’s opinion: that no one, whether at liberty or 
subject to police detention, is obligated to speak when a police officer 
poses questions to him.30 Justice White cited no authority for this point. 
To him, it was apparently self-evident. That none of his brethren, 
either those who joined the Court’s opinion or those in dissent, took 
issue with his description of what the Court had done in Terry is telling. 
Over the following half-century, a large number of justices would cite 
Justice White’s concurring opinion favorably, treating it as the kind of 
noncontroversial statement of law that he intended it to be.31 In many 
 
 29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 30. Justice Harlan announced a similar principle in his separate concurrence: 
Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers 
dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a 
person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but 
to be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, 
possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily 
the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away . . . . 
Id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 31. See, e.g., Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding “no good 
reason . . . to reject [Justice White’s] generation-old statement of the law”); Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw enforcement officers 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the 
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, 
by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a 
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the 
officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a 
seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however, 
need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions 
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ways, the Court has treated Justice White’s concurrence in Terry the 
same way it treats Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United 
States32: as a concurrence that provides the heart of the Court’s 
meaning.33 As we discuss more fully below, the Supreme Court has long 
assumed the truth of Justice White’s concurrence: although an 
individual may be briefly detained based on reasonable suspicion, the 
Fourth Amendment prevents law enforcement from arresting that 
individual for refusing to answer questions during a Terry stop. 
2. Miranda v. Arizona and the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
protects an individual from having her coerced statements used against 
her during a criminal trial. However, because the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits only the use of those statements in which an individual’s will 
is actually overborn by government coercion, the Supreme Court in 
Miranda v. Arizona34 created a prophylactic rule more extensive than 
the Fifth Amendment itself in order to afford greater protections to 
criminal suspects. This Section examines how both the Fifth 
Amendment and the Miranda rule protect individuals questioned by 
the police during brief investigative stops. 
a. The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment is both an obvious place in which to ground 
a right not to speak to the police and a difficult doctrinal fit.35 The 
Amendment is principally understood as a trial right;36 the Supreme 
 
at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, 
objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, 
furnish those grounds.” (citations omitted)). 
 32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 33. See, e.g., Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: 
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 14 (“Although the Katz majority’s assertion that ‘the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places’ is cited in numerous opinions, it is typically 
followed by an application of Justice Harlan’s concurrence test based on reasonable 
expectations of privacy.”). 
 34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 36. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (“The privilege 
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial 
right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to 
trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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Court has held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated until 
compelled statements obtained from a criminal suspect are introduced 
against him at trial.37 In such circumstances, a defendant must show 
three things to demonstrate a Fifth Amendment violation. First, the 
compulsion complained of must be at the hands of a government actor 
rather than internal to the defendant or exerted by a third party.38 
Second, only the compulsion of testimonial communications violates 
the privilege.39 Criminal defendants are often compelled to provide 
the government with incriminating evidence: their fingerprints, their 
blood, their DNA, their handwriting, and so on.40 These compulsions 
do not violate the privilege because they do not implicate the cruel 
trilemma that the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent: the 
choice between perjuring oneself, being held in contempt, or making 
incriminating statements.41 Third, the privilege applies only to those 
“disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so 
used.”42 These requirements obviously impose great difficulty on one 
raising a Fifth Amendment challenge after being arrested for 
noncompliance with police questioning. The Fifth Amendment 
generally prohibits the introduction of compelled statements in Court, 
and in these cases, there are neither compelled statements nor a 
criminal prosecution in which those statements could be introduced. 
However, the Supreme Court has also held that the government 
cannot burden the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. So, 
for example, in Griffin v. California,43 the Court held that prosecutors 
could not comment upon at trial, or invite jurors to draw negative 
inferences from, the fact that a defendant had invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to testify.44 Surely, if a jury cannot be 
 
 37. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004) (holding that the 
introduction of the physical fruits of a Miranda violation at trial violates neither 
Miranda nor the Fifth Amendment itself). 
 38. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The most outrageous 
behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not 
make that evidence inadmissible . . . .”). 
 39. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (“We hold that the privilege 
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise 
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature . . . .”). 
 40. Id. at 764–65 (excluding blood test from Fifth Amendment privilege and reaffirming 
that fingerprinting and writing samples receive no Fifth Amendment protection). 
 41. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976). 
 42. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972). 
 43. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 44. Id. at 613–15. 
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directed to the fact that a defendant has invoked his right, it would seem 
that the government cannot impose other negative consequences—
such as arrest and formal charges—when a suspect invokes her rights 
in the face of police questioning.45 Yet, the law on this point, as we shall 
see below, is surprisingly unsettled.46 
Part of the reason that there is little settled law on the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment in the interrogation context is that a Fifth 
Amendment right must be asserted expressly in order to be effective. 
In 2013, a plurality of the Supreme Court held in Salinas v. Texas47 that 
silence and evasion in the face of police questioning was not an 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and thus, a prosecutor 
could comment upon it at trial.48 Because the suspect merely remained 
silent rather than stating he was invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, 
a fact that might have several plausible explanations, the plurality held 
he had not expressly invoked his privilege.49 Thus, it would seem, an 
individual who sits mute in response to police questioning has not even 
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights and cannot claim that the state 
imposed consequences upon the exercise of that right. 
b. Miranda v. Arizona 
Perhaps because the Fifth Amendment has been read narrowly—
applying only to incriminating statements introduced in court and 
only when the defendant has clearly invoked the privilege, etc.—the 
Supreme Court in Miranda created a prophylactic rule whose scope is 
 
 45. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 467 (1966) (“Today, then, there 
can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court 
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action 
is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Opinion, Can the Police Retaliate Against a Citizen for Refusing 
to Answer Police Questions?, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/19/can-the-police-
retaliate-against-a-citizen-for-refusing-to-answer-police-questions. 
 47. 570 U.S. 178 (2013) (plurality). 
 48. Id. at 189. 
 49. Id. (finding the suspect’s silence “insolubly ambiguous” rather than an 
unequivocal invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 617 (1976))). 
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion with regard to the right to remain 
silent in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387–89 (2010). Thompkins remained 
silent for hours under police questioning; the Court ultimately ruled that this was not 
an invocation of his right to remain silent and that his interrogators were not required 
to cease questioning and obtain a waiver of Thompkins’ right to remain silent before 
interrogating him. Id. 
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broader than that of the Fifth Amendment privilege itself.50 After 
surveying the kinds of police interrogation practices then in place—
which called for a suspect to be isolated and made vulnerable but not 
directly threatened or coerced51—the Court concluded that it needed 
to expand the protections enjoyed by criminal defendants in the 
interrogation room. Given the inherently coercive nature of custodial 
interrogation, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination required the police to apprise suspects of 
their rights prior to the commencement of such questioning.52 The 
now-ubiquitous warnings—that an individual has the right to remain 
silent, the right to have an attorney present, the right to appointed 
counsel—apply to any individual subject to custodial interrogation.53 A 
statement taken in the absence of these procedures and a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the specified rights is irrebuttably 
presumed to be coerced.54 The Court created the Miranda in part 
because the Fifth Amendment itself provided little protection outside 
of its narrow terms. 
Although the Miranda Court described the custody that triggered 
the warnings as any significant interference with an individual’s 
autonomy,55 it has since chosen to narrow the definition of custody. 
 
 50. 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966); see United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) 
(concluding that Miranda’s prophylactic rule “necessarily sweep[s] beyond the actual 
protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause”). 
 51. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455. The Court explained, 
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting 
prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, 
it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to 
deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt 
undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the 
police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless 
questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must 
“patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the 
desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce 
the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving 
false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, 
by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then 
persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 444–45. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). But see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 
653 (1984) (holding that there is a “public safety” exception to the Miranda requirement). 
 55. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”). 
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For our purposes, the most important example is the Supreme Court’s 
1984 decision in Berkemer v. McCarty,56 holding that Miranda does not 
apply to run-of-the-mill traffic stops.57 The Court concluded that police 
need not read a suspect his Miranda rights prior to questioning him 
during such a stop because such stops are not custodial.58 Writing for 
a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall reasoned that Miranda was 
concerned with the inherently coercive nature of incommunicado 
interrogations that take place within the secrecy and isolation of police 
stations.59 By contrast, automobile stops are necessarily brief, take place 
in view of the public, and thus raise fewer coercion concerns.60 
The Berkemer Court was careful to point out that freeing investigating 
officers of the shackles of Miranda did not leave them free to run 
roughshod over the rights of motorists. In particular, the Court 
unanimously endorsed Justice White’s Terry concurrence, citing it 
positively and stating that: 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks 
probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to 
suspect” that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to 
“investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” “[T]he stop 
and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification 
for their initiation.’” Typically, this means that the officer may ask 
the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his 
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling 
the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And, 
unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause 
to arrest him, he must then be released.61 
 
 56. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 57. Id. at 437–40. 
 58. Id. at 439–40 (“[T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry 
stop’ than to a formal arrest . . . . The comparatively nonthreatening character of 
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry 
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.”). 
 59. Id. at 440. Of course, in Berkemer, the Court merely held the prophylactic rule 
created in Miranda did not apply to traffic stops. Berkemer did not authorize, and in fact 
could not authorize, the police to engage in coercive conduct that would have run 
afoul of the Fifth Amendment prior to Miranda. Although the police need not read a 
suspect her Miranda rights during traffic stops, they obviously cannot coerce an 
individual into making statements against their will. 
 60. Id. at 437–38 (justifying the lack of a requirement for Miranda warnings during 
traffic stops because they are temporary, brief, and public, thereby making them less 
coercive than stationhouse interrogations). 
 61. Id. at 439–40 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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The Court’s unanimous endorsement of this view of Terry cannot be 
overstated. Although later courts might write off this language as dicta 
(Berkemer did not, in fact, refuse to speak to the officers), a clearer 
endorsement of a right to silence during Terry stops is difficult to 
imagine. The Court’s final point, that the state cannot arrest an 
individual without probable cause, leads directly into the final 
substantive area raised by refusal to answer questions during traffic 
stops: the First Amendment. 
3. The First Amendment 
Because police questioning during a traffic stop involves the 
defendant’s speech—or lack thereof—the First Amendment seems an 
obvious place to ground constitutional protections against compelled 
communications. As we shall see, however, courts have been unwilling 
to find a right not to speak to the police in the free speech clause. 
a. The right not to answer police questions 
The First Amendment protects not only the right to speak but also 
the right not to have one’s speech compelled. So, for example, in 
Wooley v. Maynard,62 the Maynards, two members of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith, argued that the New Hampshire state motto “live free or 
die” was repugnant to their beliefs and that they could not be 
compelled to display it on their license plate.63 After cutting the words 
“or die” off his license plate, Maynard was convicted under a statute 
prohibiting the defacing of license plates, served his fifteen-day 
sentence, and then sued to enjoin further enforcement of the state 
statute. The Supreme Court agreed with him, finding “New 
Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that appellees use their private 
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—
or suffer a penalty, as Maynard already has.”64 Similarly, the Court 
recently found merit in a suit brought by California women’s health 
organizations against a state law that would require them to display 
certain information about in-state abortion providers.65 The Court 
found the statute impinged on the First Amendment rights of those 
required to display the information because the required messages 
amounted to more than “purely factual and uncontroversial 
 
 62. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 63. Id. at 706–08. 
 64. Id. at 707–08, 715. 
 65. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018) 
(finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits in their constitutional challenge 
to two notice requirements imposed by the state). 
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disclosures.”66 It noted, “California cannot co-opt the licensed facilities 
to deliver its message for it. ‘[T]he First Amendment does not permit 
the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.’”67 
The implications of this right against compelled speech for police-
citizen interactions might seem obvious. A reading of the First 
Amendment that protects an individual from having her speech 
compelled as well as from having it silenced would seem to prohibit 
police officers from forcing answers from those with whom they 
interact. However, the Supreme Court has generally invoked the 
compelled speech doctrine only when the government is dictating the 
content of an individual’s speech rather than simply requiring them to 
speak truthfully.68 In fact, neither the Court itself nor, as this Article 
will show,69 the lower federal courts have ever applied the First 
Amendment to bar law enforcement officers from compelling answers 
to their questions.70 
b. Retaliatory arrest 
The principal way, therefore, that the First Amendment factors into 
the Terry stop context is with regard to retaliatory arrest—a topic that has 
found itself on the Supreme Court’s docket with surprising regularity of 
late.71 Most recently, the Court considered the case of Russell P. Bartlett, 
who sued two police officers after they arrested him at Alaska’s 2014 Arctic 
Man festival.72 Bartlett objected to the officers’ questioning of some 
nearby teenagers but would not speak with the officers when they tried to 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995) (“It is true 
that ‘the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state 
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.’ A First Amendment protection against compelled speech, however, has been 
found only in the context of governmental compulsion to disseminate a particular 
political or ideological message.” (citation omitted)). 
 69. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 70. As one widely cited district court held, “Plaintiffs cite no authority to support 
the application of the First Amendment protection against government-compelled 
ideological or political speech into the context of police interviews, which are covered 
by the more specific protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.” 
McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 949 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, dismissed in part sub nom, Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 71. In the last thirteen years, the Court has decided four such cases: Nieves v. 
Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 (2019); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 138 S. Ct. 
1945, 1949 (2018); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 660 (2012); and Hartman v. Moore, 
547 U.S. 250, 254 (2006). 
 72. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. at 1720. 
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talk with him.73 After Bartlett confronted the officers, one of them pushed 
Bartlett away before the other arrested him. He alleged that during the 
arrest the officer told him “bet you wish you would have talked to me 
now.”74 Bartlett sued under § 1983, alleging that the arrest was in 
retaliation for his intervention in the officers’ questioning and his 
refusal to speak with them when confronted.75 
The Court began by reiterating that police officers may not arrest in 
retaliation for a valid exercise of speech rights.76 But the Court granted 
certiorari to decide a narrower issue that had confounded the lower courts: 
whether a demonstration of probable cause to arrest would always defeat a 
retaliatory arrest claim.77 The Court held that, in most circumstances, it 
would.78 Rather than focusing on the subjective intent of the officers, the 
Court reasoned, the focus in a retaliatory arrest case should generally be on 
whether there were legal grounds to make the arrest.79 As in many Fourth 
Amendment contexts, the Court held that objective factors—such as the 
existence of probable cause to arrest—were a better basis of decision than 
subjective factors—like the malevolent intent of the officers.80 
 
 73. Id. at 1721 (“We are asked to resolve whether probable cause to make an arrest 
defeats a claim that the arrest was in retaliation for speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”). 
 74. Id. As with the lower court Terry decisions discussed below, in Bartlett, the state 
dismissed the charges against the arrestee. 
 75. Though it might seem to raise the issue at the heart of this Article, Bartlett was 
decided on the ground that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because 
he was drunk and belligerent with one of the officers. Although the officer’s statement 
was evidence that refusal to speak with him formed part of the basis for his decision to 
arrest, the Court did not rely on that fact in resolving the case. Quoting the Court of 
Appeals, the Court concluded “a reasonable officer in Sergeant Nieves’s position could 
have concluded that Bartlett stood close to Trooper Weight and spoke loudly in order 
to challenge him, provoking Trooper Weight to push him back.” Id. at 1728. 
 76. Id. at 1722 (“‘[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits 
government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging 
in protected speech.” (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006))). 
 77. Id. at 1721. 
 78. Id. at 1724–25. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1724 (“[B]because probable cause speaks to the objective reasonableness 
of an arrest, its absence will—as in retaliatory prosecution cases—generally provide 
weighty evidence that the officer’s animus caused the arrest, whereas the presence of 
probable cause will suggest the opposite.”). The only exception, the Court announced, 
would be in those “circumstances where officers have probable cause to make arrests, 
but typically exercise their discretion not to do so. In such cases, an unyielding 
requirement to show the absence of probable cause could pose ‘a risk that some police 
officers may exploit the arrest power as a means of suppressing speech.’” Id. at 1727 
(“For example, at many intersections, jaywalking is endemic but rarely results in arrest. 
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c. Obstruction of justice statutes 
Bartlett points out the importance of state obstruction of justice 
statutes in determining the validity of arrests for failure to comply with 
police questioning. If such a statute does not provide probable cause 
to arrest an individual for refusing to answer police questioning, an 
officer violates the Fourth Amendment (and likely the First 
Amendment as well) if he nonetheless arrests a suspect for failure to 
answer his questions. Because there is no probable cause to arrest in 
such circumstances, a claim of retaliation is cognizable. 
All states have statutes on their books that criminalize interfering 
with or obstructing an officer in the execution of her official duties or 
engaging in disruptive conduct.81 When applied to speech—or, in our 
case silence—these statutes can obviously raise constitutional 
concerns.82 For example, in Norwell v. City of Cincinnati,83 the United 
States Supreme Court reversed Norwell’s conviction for disorderly 
conduct under Ohio law, holding that a state may not punish an 
individual for nonprovocatively voicing an objection to a police 
officer’s conduct.84 Following Norwell, a number of states, either as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, constitutional avoidance, or 
interpretation of the First Amendment and its state analogues, have 
read their state obstruction of justice statutes to prohibit arrest based 
solely on verbal disagreement with an officer carrying out her duties.85 
 
If an individual who has been vocally complaining about police conduct is arrested for 
jaywalking at such an intersection, it would seem insufficiently protective of First 
Amendment rights to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground 
that there was undoubted probable cause for the arrest.”). 
 81. See, e.g., John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American 
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 76–77 (2004) (“The fifty states and the District of Columbia 
have taken a variety of statutory approaches to prohibit the obstruction of justice.”). 
 82. See id. at 112 (“Generally, a person’s words alone are not an obstruction of 
justice under the various state statutes. This is primarily due to constitutional concerns 
of vagueness and overbreadth.”). 
 83. 414 U.S. 14 (1973) (per curiam). 
 84. Id. at 16 (clarifying that the use of fighting words or abusive language towards 
the officer could have resulted in a different outcome). 
 85. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 671 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). In 
concluding that the state’s obstruction statute was not meant to include verbal 
opposition to police conduct, the state court of appeals noted that a contrary holding 
would raise grave constitutional concerns. Id. (“If we were to hold that true oral 
statements are ‘acts’ for purposes of R.C. 2921.31(A), R.C. 2921.31(A) would likely be 
susceptible to charges of overbreadth for prohibiting a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. Alternatively, if we were to hold that boisterously 
spoken comments regardless of their veracity were an ‘act,’ R.C. 2921.31(A) would 
likely be unconstitutionally vague for providing no clear guideline to the 
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For example, Colorado’s obstruction statute states the following: 
A person commits obstructing a peace officer . . . when, by using or 
threatening to use violence, force, physical interference, or an 
obstacle, such person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the 
enforcement of the penal law or the preservation of the peace by a 
peace officer, acting under color of his or her official 
authority . . . .86 
In Dempsey v. People,87 the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the 
majority of states that found that verbal confrontations with the police 
could, under appropriate circumstances, form an obstacle sufficient to 
constitute obstruction of a peace officer.88 The Court concluded, 
however, that while the defendant’s speech may be a factor in 
determining whether the defendant obstructed the enforcement of 
the laws, mere verbal opposition to police cannot be the sole factor on 
which an arrest is made.89 
Fewer states have clarified, by statute or as a matter of statutory or 
constitutional interpretation, whether silence and refusal to cooperate 
will suffice to make out a case of obstruction. Some, in fact, have made 
clear that failure to speak to officers can constitute obstruction of 
justice.90 Obviously, a state cannot authorize its officials to violate the 
Constitution; a statute that criminalizes objecting to an officer’s 
conduct would not pass constitutional muster after Norwell. Nor would 
a statute that permits officers to arrest an individual who refuses to 
answer questions, if, as we argue, there is a constitutional right not to 
answer such questions. On the other hand, if a state does not authorize 
arrest for refusal to cooperate with a police investigation, officers who 
 
impermissible volume that hampers a public official. Our interpretation of R.C. 
2921.31(A) avoids these pitfalls.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Harris v. State, 726 
S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (deciding on statutory grounds that Harris’ refusal 
to cooperate with the police did not constitute obstruction, thus obviating the need to 
decide Harris’ constitutional challenge to the statute). 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-104(1)(a) (2019). 
 87. 117 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2005) (en banc). 
 88. Id. at 811 (“Although no cases exactly address the facts presented in this case, 
the consensus among courts grappling with similar statutes is that where the statute 
punishes both ‘threats’ and ‘use’ of physical interference and obstacle, neither 
‘physical contact’ nor actual physical interference is required.”). 
 89. The Dempsey court held that “although mere verbal opposition alone may not 
suffice, a combination of statements and acts by the defendant, including threats of physical 
interference or interposition of an obstacle can form the crime of obstruction.” Id. 
 90. See, e.g., State v. Carney, 663 S.E.2d 606, 611 (W. Va. 2008) (per curiam) (“Only 
when such silence occurs after the police officer has indicated why the individual’s name is 
being sought in relation to official police duties or in connection with an express statutory 
directive can non-speech amount to the offense of obstruction . . . .”). 
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do so necessarily violate the Constitution. Because such an arrest is 
without probable cause—the state has made explicit that the 
underlying facts do not make out an offense under the laws of the 
state—an officer who conducts such an arrest opens herself to suit. As 
we argue in our concluding section, both state legislatures and state 
courts have a role to play in clarifying whether an individual is 
obligated to answer police questions.91 
4. Putting the pieces together: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
To date, the closest the Court has come to weighing in on the 
obligation to speak to police during a Terry stop is its 2001 decision in 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court.92 Larry Hiibel was involved in an 
altercation by the side of a rural route in Nevada with a woman who 
was later determined to be his daughter. When sheriff’s deputies 
arrived on the scene, in response to a domestic violence call involving 
the pair, they demanded identification from Hiibel who repeatedly 
refused to comply.93 The officer, frustrated with Hiibel’s intransigence, 
arrested him under a state statute that prohibited “willfully resist[ing], 
delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or 
attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.”94 The state 
convicted Hiibel and fined him $250, and he appealed his case all the 
way to the Supreme Court.95 
The Court acknowledged that Hiibel raised an issue that prior 
precedents left “open”: whether a suspect is obligated to answer 
questions posed to him during a Terry stop.96 Hiibel maintained that 
Justice White’s opinion in Terry and the language quoted above from 
the unanimous decision in Berkemer made clear that, although an 
individual may be briefly detained and questioned pursuant to Terry, 
 
 91. See infra Part III. 
 92. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 93. Hiibel posted a video of the stop to a website, and it is now widely available 
online. See, e.g., Dudley Hiibel, Watch the Video, PAPERS PLEASE (July 9, 2004), 
https://papersplease.org/hiibel/index.html [https://perma.cc/FNV3-8KMR]; Felix 
Tam, Encounter Between Larry Hiibel & Nevada Highway Patrol, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APynGWWqD8Y [https://perma.cc/JG29-T9 8G]. 
It shows him refusing, as many as eleven times, to provide the officers with his 
identification. It is clear from his demeanor that he firmly believed he had a right to 
refuse to identify himself absent probable cause for an arrest. 
 94. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181–82 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.280 (West 2019)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 186–87 (“Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect 
to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether 
the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer.”). 
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he cannot be compelled to cooperate with the officers during that 
stop.97 The Court disagreed, describing the importance to law 
enforcement of knowing the identity of the person with whom they 
were dealing: “Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a 
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or 
mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear 
a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.”98 
The language in Terry and Berkemer, the Court continued, which 
expressed the view that one cannot be arrested for failing to answer 
officers’ questions, cannot be seen as “answering the question whether 
a State can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry stop.”99 
The Court also found that Hiibel’s arrest did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment.100 The Court declined to answer whether giving one’s 
name is testimonial rather than more akin to giving a writing exemplar 
or a blood sample; the latter may be coerced without running afoul of 
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, while the former 
may not.101 Rather, it resolved the Fifth Amendment issue on the 
ground that one’s name will rarely be incriminating: 
Even today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his 
name could have been used against him in a criminal case. While we 
recognize petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to disclose 
his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada 
Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief 
that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.102 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 186. In affirming the constitutionality of Hiibel’s arrest, the Supreme 
Court distinguished its prior decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (per 
curiam), in which it had held that an individual cannot be arrested simply for failing 
to identify himself to the police when asked. Hiibel, 443 U.S. at 184–85. The Nevada 
statute, unlike the Texas statute permitted arrest for failure to identify oneself only in 
the course of an otherwise lawful stop (one for which reasonable suspicion already 
existed) while the Texas statute allowed officers to demand identification without first 
articulating reasonable suspicion for detaining an individual. Id. 
 99. Id. at 187. 
 100. Id. at 189. 
 101. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764–65 (1966) (“[B]oth federal 
and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to 
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for 
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a 
particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different 
ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ 
but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical 
evidence’ does not violate it.”). 
 102. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190–91. 
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It is important to see how the Court cabined its conclusion in Hiibel that 
officers can compel an individual subject to an investigative stop to identify 
himself under penalty of arrest. The Court distinguished questions about 
identity—which may be necessary for officer safety and which are incredibly 
unlikely in themselves to be incriminating—from other police questioning. 
Identity, it seemed for the Court, was sui generis: 
Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop serves 
important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform 
an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record 
of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity 
may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts 
elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as 
this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic 
assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know 
whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat 
to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.103 
Perhaps more significantly, sharing one’s identity is unlike answering 
other questions because one’s name is uniquely unlikely to be 
incriminating. Unlike the questions typically asked in a traffic stop—
“Have you been drinking tonight?” “Do you have any contraband in the 
car?” “Where are you coming from?”—being compelled to give one’s name 
is vanishingly unlikely, in and of itself, to require one to incriminate oneself. 
Although the Hiibel Court did not find itself bound by Justice White’s 
concurrence in Terry or what it termed the dicta of Berkemer, its 
conclusion does nothing to repudiate those opinions. Rather, the Court 
simply did not find the general principle contained in those opinions to 
be dispositive of the narrower question: whether identification could be 
compelled. As the four-member Hiibel dissent pointed out: 
This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of references, and of 
clear explicit statements—means that the Court’s statement in 
Berkemer, while technically dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the 
legal community typically takes as a statement of the law. And that 
law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.104 
As this dissent makes clear, over the years, many justices have 
expressed the view that one is not obligated to answer police 
questioning, often citing Justice White’s Terry concurrence with 
approval. For example, in Davis v. Mississippi,105 decided just one year 
after Terry, a seven-member majority wrote: 
 
 103. Id. at 186. 
 104. Id. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 105. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
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The State relies on various statements in our cases which approve 
general questioning of citizens in the course of investigating a crime. 
But these statements merely reiterated the settled principle that 
while the police have the right to request citizens to answer 
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right 
to compel them to answer.106 
In addition, a four-justice plurality in Florida v. Royer107 favorably cited 
Justice White’s concurrence for the proposition that: 
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment 
by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another 
public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, 
by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by 
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers 
to such questions.108 
Moreover, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens favorably cited 
both Justice White’s Terry concurrence and the Davis decision in their 
dissent in Michigan v. DeFillippo109: 
Furthermore, while a person may be briefly detained against his will 
on the basis of reasonable suspicion “while pertinent questions are 
directed to him . . . the person stopped is not obliged to answer, 
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for an arrest . . . .” Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 34 (White, J., 
concurring). In the context of criminal investigation, the privacy 
interest in remaining silent simply cannot be overcome at the whim 
of any suspicious police officer. “[W]hile the police have the right to 
request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved 
crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.” Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969).110 
The Court’s decision in Kolender v. Lawson111 is also emblematic. A 
seven-member majority cited Davis’s “settled principle” language in 
expressing constitutional doubts about a California statute that would 
criminalize the failure to answer police questions.112 Justice Brennan, 
who joined the majority, concurred to offer a broader understanding 
of a person’s Fourth Amendment right to silence during a Terry stop. 
 
 106. Id. at 727 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 107. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
 108. Id. at 497. 
 109. 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 44. 
 111. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
 112. Id. at 360, n.9 (“It is a ‘settled principle that while the police have the right to request 
citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to 
compel them to answer.’” (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 727, n.6 (1969))). 
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In concurring with the judgment finding California’s stop-and-identify 
statute void for vagueness, Justice Brennan explained: 
[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, police officers with reasonable 
suspicion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a 
crime may detain that individual, using some force if necessary, for 
the purpose of asking investigative questions. They may ask their 
questions in a way calculated to obtain an answer. But they may not 
compel an answer, and they must allow the person to leave after a 
reasonably brief period of time unless the information they have 
acquired during the encounter has given them probable cause 
sufficient to justify an arrest. 
California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by making it a 
crime to refuse to answer police questions during a Terry encounter, 
any more than it could abridge the protections of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments by making it a crime to refuse to answer police 
questions once a suspect has been taken into custody.113 
In other words, the Court has repeatedly cited with approval the idea 
that one stopped by the police for investigation cannot be compelled 
to answer questions put to him. As the Court noted in Hiibel, it had not 
previously (and has not since) been asked to directly address the 
question of whether there is a right to ignore police questioning 
during a Terry stop.114 However, a long history of Supreme Court dicta 
clearly endorses such a right. Perhaps more importantly, there appears 
to be no contrary precedent or conflict from the Court on this point. 
We were unable to find a single Justice in a single case contesting the 
validity of Justice White’s Terry concurrence; each time a member of 
the Court has referenced the opinion he or she has done so positively. 
* * * 
This reading of Terry and its progeny comports with the overall 
structure of the Supreme Court’s treatment of police-suspect 
interactions. The Court has identified three levels of citizen-police 
interactions: consensual encounters, investigative stops, and arrests. 
The right to remain silent during consensual encounters with the 
police is uncontested. In fact, the power to ignore police questions and 
go about one’s business is one of the definitions of a consensual 
encounter.115 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s entire Miranda 
 
 113. Id. at 366–67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
 114. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–87 (2004). 
 115. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 437 (1991) (“We have said before 
that the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a 
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jurisprudence is premised on the notion that the right of individuals 
in custodial interrogations to refuse to answer questions is so 
important that the individual must be apprised of it explicitly.116 If an 
individual subject to custodial interrogation invokes the right not to 
answer police questioning, questioning must cease.117 It is only for the 
middle category of encounters, brief investigatory stops, that the 
Supreme Court has not yet explicitly held that the right to remain 
silent is clearly established. If those at liberty need not speak to the 
police and those under arrest need not either, it is impossible to justify 
requiring those who find themselves between these two extremes to 
speak to the police under penalty of arrest. The only explanation for 
the lack of clarity on this point is that the Supreme Court has not had 
a case directly raising this question—perhaps because the answer to 
the question has seemed obvious for two generations. 
The right to silence during Terry stops is just one example of the 
Court’s consistent position that the state cannot impose negative 
consequences on a suspect for invoking her constitutional rights. For 
example, in Florida v. Bostick,118 the Supreme Court stated that the 
refusal to consent to a search cannot, without more, be the basis for 
increased suspicion regarding the area searched.119 In Griffin, the 
Court held that the decision to invoke the right to silence cannot be 
used to create a negative inference regarding the defendant’s guilt.120 
The Court has also held that, although a court may impose a higher 
sentence on remand following a successful criminal appeal, that 
higher sentence must reflect something other than vindictiveness of 
 
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about 
his business.’” (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988))). 
 116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (“Miranda was not in any way 
apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the 
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively 
protected in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible.”). 
 117. Id. at 473–74 (“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is 
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”). 
 118. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 119. Id. at 437 (“We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without 
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a 
detention or seizure.”); see also Kenneth J. Melilli, The Consequences of Refusing Consent 
to a Search or Seizure: The Unfortunate Constitutionalization of an Evidentiary Issue, 75 S. 
CALIF. L. REV. 901, 903–04 (2002) (pointing out that courts have consistently found 
“routine refusal to consent to a search or seizure may not be admitted as . . . 
supporting a determination of probable cause” or for “supporting a determination of 
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop”). 
 120. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
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the sentencing judge against a defendant’s assertion of her rights.121 
All of these cases stand for a proposition that having a right means the 
opportunity to exercise that right unfettered.122 
Together, all of these factors—the Court’s repeated approval of 
Justice White’s Terry concurrence, the fact that there is no obligation 
to speak with the police in other contexts, and other areas in which the 
Court has made clear that exercising one’s rights cannot be 
punished—clearly indicate that there is no obligation to answer police 
questions during a Terry stop. 
B.   The Procedural Realities of Litigating a Right Not to Speak 
Thus far, we have focused solely on the substantive law that applies 
to the police-suspect interaction during Terry stops. However, an 
important point of this Article is that the ultimate merits of a 
constitutional claim are rarely even reached by lower federal courts 
adjudicating these claims, largely because of the procedural rules for 
evaluating such claims. 
Theoretically, the issue of whether police can attempt to compel 
answers to their questions during a Terry stop can arise in at least three 
distinct procedural contexts. First, police may arrest an individual for 
failure to answer questions, and that individual may bring a 
constitutional challenge when charged with the crime of obstruction 
or interference with an officer. Recall that this is what happened in 
Hiibel: Hiibel fought his $250 fine all the way to the United States 
 
 121. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (“Due process of 
law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new 
trial.”), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801–03 (1989). 
 122. The most glaring exception to this is likely the so-called trial penalty in 
criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Putting the Trial Penalty on Trial, 51 
DUQ. L. REV. 777, 777 (2013) (“The ‘trial penalty’ is a concept widely accepted by all 
the major actors in the criminal justice system: defendants, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, court employees, and judges. The notion is that defendants receive longer 
sentences at trial than they would have through plea bargain, often substantially 
longer. The concept is intuitive: longer sentences [given after trial] are necessary in 
order to induce settlements and without a high settlement rate it would be impossible 
for courts as currently structured to sustain their immense caseload.”); Andrew 
Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial 
Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2015) (“The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the 
right to trial by a jury of their peers. Today, however, the vast majority of convictions 
are obtained by guilty pleas, in which defendants forgo their right to trial and simply 
admit their guilt in open court. The conventional wisdom is that this shift was caused 
by increasingly large trial penalties and the rise in plea bargaining.”). 
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Supreme Court, arguing that the Nevada statute that permitted his 
arrest for failing to identify himself was unconstitutional. Such cases 
are rare,123 however, because the stakes are relatively low; most people 
are not willing to fight a small fine all the way to the Supreme Court.124 
Furthermore, the state may always moot such a claim by choosing not 
to charge an individual with obstruction at all or to drop those charges 
in the face of a constitutional challenge. Second, the issue may arise in 
the context of a motion to suppress evidence obtained from an illegal 
arrest. If it is unconstitutional to arrest based on refusal to cooperate 
with police questioning, then evidence seized directly incident to that 
arrest is likely to be suppressed.125 Reported cases with this posture are 
rare, likely because successful suppression motions, if not appealed by 
the government, are unlikely to result in reported cases. Lastly, and 
most commonly, a person who has been arrested (but has either not 
been charged or has had the case dismissed) can bring a civil lawsuit 
against the arresting officers and others under § 1983.126 This was the 
posture in both Bartlett and the Musarra example that led off this 
 
 123. Outside of the federal courts, there are some exceptions. See, e.g., People v. 
Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908, 910, 914 (N.Y. 1980) (suppressing evidence seized after a 
defendant failed to stop to answer police questions when asked to do so). 
 124. As one commentator has noted, it is often extremely difficult to know exactly 
how widespread arrests for obstruction of justice are in the United States. Erin Murphy, 
Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1471 (2009) 
(“[U]ncovering records of stop-and-identify arrests prove even more elusive. The stop-
and-identify arrest will often serve as an entry point to search or interrogate a 
suspicious person in the hopes of obtaining more information. If incriminating 
information does not materialize, then the stop-and-identify charge may also dissipate; 
if it does, then the charge is apt to get lost in the bargaining process.”). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (“[T]he exclusionary 
sanction applies to any ‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation . . . [that occurs] during an 
illegal arrest and detention.”). But see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) 
(holding that the existence of a valid arrest warrant can save evidence obtained from 
an arrest that began unconstitutionally). 
 126. That statute reads, in relevant part, 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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Article,127 one we will see time and again in the cases discussed below.128 
Understanding the procedural reality of litigating these claims is 
crucial to understanding why we are still asking fundamental questions 
about Terry stops more than fifty years after Terry was decided. 
1. Section 1983 litigation 
A plaintiff bringing a suit under § 1983129 faces a number of 
procedural hurdles.130 Principally, suing a local official for money 
damages requires a plaintiff to overcome the officer’s qualified 
immunity. The judicially-created doctrine of qualified immunity reflects 
the Supreme Court’s view that public officials should not be personally 
liable for their actions unless it would have been clear to a reasonable 
officer in their place that their actions were unconstitutional at the time 
that they acted.131 The Court has reasoned that without qualified 
immunity to protect public officials, the threat of liability might 
overdeter them in exercising their discretion in the field.132 In Saucier 
v. Katz,133 the Supreme Court laid out the twin showings a § 1983 
plaintiff seeking money damages must make in order to recover: she 
 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 128. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 129. Although the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 397 (1971), that a similar cause of action was available against federal 
officials, we have discovered no such cases and refer throughout only to § 1983. 
However, the analysis for a Bivens action would be largely identical. 
 130. See, e.g., Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory 
Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931 (2010) (reasoning that pleading barriers and 
qualified immunity have led to the Court’s preference of equitable and injunctive 
relief over monetary compensation). 
 131. See, e.g., John M. Graebe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 CONST. 
COMMENT. 189, 196 n.31 (2008) (“The Court feared that without an immunity that 
shields state actors from liability when they have acted reasonably, ‘executive officials 
would hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals even when the public interest require[s] bold and unhesitating 
action.’” (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744–45 (1982)). 
 132. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (“The public interest in 
deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by 
a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an 
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or 
constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury 
caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official’s duties 
legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the 
public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and without 
fear of consequences.’” (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). 
 133. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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must establish (1) that a constitutional violation occurred,134 and (2) 
that the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.135 
The Saucier Court went further and held that lower courts should 
always determine the first prong—whether a constitutional violation 
occurred—before proceeding to the “clearly established” issue.136 The 
reason for mandating this sequence requirement was straightforward: 
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated 
on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth 
principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly 
established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to 
case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence 
or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law 
might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead 
to the question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s 
conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.137 
As one author of this Article has argued, Saucier’s merits-first order 
of decision making in constitutional tort litigation is necessary to 
prevent the stagnation of constitutional law: 
[I]f the entitlement to qualified immunity were determined before 
the merits of the underlying case, difficult issues and close cases 
would almost never be decided on the merits in damages actions. To 
say that a case is close is to say that the law is not well established; to 
say that the law is not well-established is to say that the defendant is 
entitled to qualified immunity; to say that the defendant is entitled 
to qualified immunity is to say that the Court need not resolve the 
merits of the close case. This nearly circular analysis could serve to 
stagnate the substance of constitutional law almost indefinitely. It is 
 
 134. Id. at 201 (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must 
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party 
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.”). 
 135. Id. (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations 
established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. 
On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ 
submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly 
established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific 
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .”). 
 136. Id. Prior to Saucier, the Court stated that reaching the merits first was the better 
approach but did not mandate the lower courts to do so. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which 
the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff 
has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally, it is only then that 
a court should ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the 
time of the events in question.” (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). 
 137. 533 U.S. at 201. 
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only when the Court first looks at the substance of each 
constitutional claim brought before it and then looks to whether the 
plaintiff will be entitled to benefit that qualified immunity can have 
[a] progressive influence on the law . . . .138 
Without an incentive to reach the merits, courts are inclined to decide 
close cases in favor of public official defendants on the basis of 
qualified immunity. Because the law is unclear, public officials are 
entitled, at an early stage, to dismissal of the claims against them. What 
is more, later cases will be no more favorable to plaintiffs than earlier 
ones; because a grant of qualified immunity does not address the 
merits of the claim, the second or third case will be as easy to resolve 
on qualified immunity as the first.139 
Yet, the Supreme Court unanimously retreated from this mandatory 
order of decision making when it decided Pearson v. Callahan140 in 2009. 
Specifically, Pearson held that, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] 
is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”141 
After Pearson, lower courts were left to decide for themselves the most 
efficient way to decide constitutional tort cases. The Pearson Court 
conceded that the lower federal courts had chaffed at being required to 
reach the merits of every constitutional tort claim and acknowledged 
that busy trial courts are loath to engage in constitutional adjudication 
ultimately unnecessary to resolve the cases before them.142 While Saucier 
 
 138. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 49 
(2002) (footnotes omitted); see also John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for 
“Unnecessary” Constitutional Adjudication in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 403, 410 (1999) (noting that requiring the plaintiff to first prove the merits of 
his claim stagnates civil rights development in constitutional law). The field can only 
expand by confronting novel issues which by definition are not “clearly established.” 
A civil rights damages actions which sets forth a novel claim against a public official is 
doomed at the outset if the defendant asserts the qualified immunity defense because 
a novel claim can never be “clearly established.” Lower courts are likely to dismiss these 
types of cases on qualified immunity grounds while assuming without deciding that 
the constitutional claim is valid. Greabe, supra, at 410. 
 139. See, e.g., Michael L Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 
S.M.U. L. REV. 1539, 1559–60 (“[L]eaving the state of the law in flux permits 
defendants to escape liability for damages for constitutional violations for an indefinite 
period of time, to the detriment of persons who have suffered constitutional injuries 
and cannot recover for them. Besides the harm to victims, leaving constitutional tort 
issues undecided impedes the public interest in building a coherent and effective body 
of constitutional tort law.”). 
 140. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 141. Id. at 236. 
 142. Id. at 236–37 (explaining that the strict Saucier rule requires lower courts to expend 
extensive time and resources to consider complex constitutional questions that ultimately 
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promoted the development of constitutional principles, Pearson 
characterized the two-step requirement as an often “academic exercise” 
for busy judges “with heavy caseloads.”143 
However, the Court did not completely reverse course in Pearson. It 
simply announced that Saucier protocol was no longer mandatory, 
leaving lower courts the opportunity to determine what the appropriate 
order of decision-making should be under the specific facts and 
procedural posture of a case.144 As we discuss, the intuition the Court 
expressed in Saucier and its predecessors145—that busy courts would 
generally decide close cases in favor of defendants rather than reaching 
the merits—has been borne out in this context.146 In the principal cases 
discussed in Part II, courts use the lack of a controlling precedent on 
point as a ground for resolving the case in favor of the defendant with 
little or no analysis of the merits.147 
 
have no bearing on the outcome of the case, and that therefore it is not surprising that the 
lower courts are unenthusiastic about what often seems to be an “academic exercise”). 
 143. Id. at 237. 
 144. Id. at 236. 
 145. Saucier was hardly a bolt from a blue sky. The Court had been extolling the 
virtues of merits-first decision making for many years before it mandated the practice. 
See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (“[A] court must first determine 
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, 
and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time 
of the alleged violation.”); Cty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) 
(“The District Court granted summary judgment to Smith on the basis of qualified 
immunity, assuming without deciding that a substantive due process violation took place 
but holding that the law was not clearly established in 1990 so as to justify imposition of 
§ 1983 liability. We do not analyze this case in a similar fashion because, as we have held, 
the better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is 
raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a 
constitutional right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court should ask whether the 
right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of the events in question.”). 
 146. See infra Part II (discussing litigating the right to silence in the lower courts). 
 147. See infra Part II (exploring key cases in this area that decline to decide the case 
on the merits). Alternatively, if a litigant seeks injunctive relief rather than damages—
perhaps to avoid the specter of qualified immunity—she runs into another procedural 
hurdle. In Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Supreme Court held that 
one seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that she is likely to encounter the same 
kind of harm again in the future. Id. at 105–06, 111. In Lyons, the plaintiff, who had 
been injured by the use of a prohibited police choke hold, was unable to demonstrate 
that he was likely to suffer such an injury again and thus did not have standing to allege 
a constitutional violation. Id. at 111. Taken together, these rules operate as an 
enormous obstacle to reaching a resolution of the question presented in this Article. 
It will be very unusual indeed for a litigant to demonstrate in an injunctive suit that 
she is likely to once again be subject to a traffic stop where she is questioned and she 
refuses to comply. 
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2. Other contexts for litigating the right to refuse police questioning 
We were surprised to find so few cases litigating the right to remain 
silent during Terry stops in the context of motions to exclude evidence 
from a criminal case. The exclusionary rule and its adjutant the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine prohibit the introduction in the 
government’s case in chief of any evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment as well as any evidence that derives from such a 
violation. For most of its life, the exclusionary rule was seen as an 
automatic remedy for all Fourth Amendment violations—if the 
evidence derived from a violation of the Fourth Amendment it was 
inadmissible per se.148 In recent years, however, the Court has greatly 
relaxed this rule, creating a number of exceptions. 
For example, in Hudson v. Michigan,149 the Court announced that as a 
general matter, balancing would be applied in each case to determine 
whether the “substantial social costs” of exclusion are outweighed by a 
benefit to society.150 Largely disregarding an unbroken history of 
automatic exclusion of evidence following a Fourth Amendment 
violation, the Court wrote that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always 
been our last resort, not our first impulse.”151 The Court has also held 
that when officers reasonably rely on a statute later invalidated,152 a 
court opinion later overturned,153 or a magistrate’s incorrect 
conclusion that a warrant is supported by probable cause,154 there is 
insufficient deterrence to merit application of the exclusionary rule. 
Similarly, even in the absence of reliance, the Court has held that 
police misconduct must be sufficiently flagrant to justify exclusion. For 
example, in Herring v. United States,155 the Court held that an 
unconstitutional arrest based on a previously withdrawn arrest warrant 
did not merit exclusion of the evidence seized incident to that arrest.156 
The Court emphasized that a court should not automatically suppress 
 
 148. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). 
 149. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 150. Id. at 591. 
 151. Id. As the Hudson dissent pointed out, Hudson’s was the first case in more 
than 40 years in which the Court did not suppress the introduction of evidence seized 
from a home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 626 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (1961)). 
 152. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 341, 359–60 (1987). 
 153. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249 (2011) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply when police conduct a search in objectively 
reasonably reliance on binding appellate precedent). 
 154. Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 155. 555 U.S. 133 (2009). 
 156. Id. at 147–48. 
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evidence when a public official violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights. Rather, it must consider the culpability of law enforcement and 
whether similar conduct could be deterred in the future. Because Herring’s 
case involved an instance of isolated negligence, the Court held “the jury 
should not be barred from considering all the evidence.”157 
There is an obvious parallel between the limits the Court has placed 
on § 1983 litigation and on the operation of the exclusionary rule. In both 
areas, the Court’s focus is now not on whether or not a constitutional 
injury occurred but rather on the flagrancy of police misconduct. To the 
extent the officer’s conduct was close to the line—because the line was 
blurry, because the officer had been misinformed about where the line 
lay, or because the officer was merely careless rather than venal—no 
remedy will be available to one asserting a constitutional injury. 
Of the various contexts in which the right to remain silent during 
traffic stops can be litigated, the only one that foregrounds the merits 
of the claim is a constitutional challenge to an obstruction of justice 
prosecution. In such a challenge, the question before the Court is 
simply whether the statute infringes on a constitutional right; there are 
few, if any, procedural obstacles to reaching the merits of that claim. 
Of course, as we discuss in the next section, it is easy enough for the 
state to avoid such litigation by simply dropping the charges against 
the defendant, forcing her to become a plaintiff and to litigate her 
claims in civil court (and subject to procedural impediments). 
II.    LITIGATION OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN THE LOWER COURTS 
With that complex substantive and procedural backdrop, this section 
will discuss the three most prominent federal appellate cases litigating 
the right to remain silent in the face of police questioning. As we have 
alluded throughout, relatively few cases directly address the issue. 
Notwithstanding—or, perhaps, because of—the relative clarity of the 
Fourth Amendment law governing this question, claimants rarely 
litigate the issue and courts reach the merits even less often. 
A.   Koch v. City of Del City 
The first, and by far most cited, appellate case to address the right to 
refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop is the Tenth Circuit’s 
2011 opinion in Koch v. City of Del City.158 In Koch, the plaintiff had 
assumed the care of an elderly woman but was later subject to a court 
 
 157. Id. at 137. 
 158. 660 F.3d 1228, 1233, 1241–46 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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order requiring her to “immediately tell” the woman’s family about her 
whereabouts.159 An Oklahoma police officer received a “pick-up order” 
issued for the elderly woman and was instructed to look for her at the 
Koch’s residence.160 When the officer arrived and questioned Koch, 
however, she refused to tell the officer where the elderly woman could 
be found.161 After repeated nonresponsiveness to his questions, the 
officer arrested Koch under an Oklahoma statute prohibiting willfully 
obstructing an officer carrying out her duties.162 The charges, along with 
a charge of assaulting a police officer, were eventually dismissed when 
the whereabouts of the missing person were discovered by other means. 
Koch subsequently brought claims against the officer and city163 
under § 1983, asserting that her arrest for failing to comply with the 
officers’ questions violated her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment 
rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant 
officers on the basis of qualified immunity, and Koch appealed to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.164 The Tenth Circuit panel began by 
describing the initial encounter between the officers and Koch as a 
Terry stop because the officers were investigating the possibility that a 
crime had been committed: 
Having decided that the encounter at issue constituted a Terry stop, 
the question becomes whether, as a matter of law, an individual 
subject to a Terry stop has the right to refuse to answer an officer’s 
questions. In our view, this question not only implicates the Fourth 
Amendment’s right against unreasonable seizures, but potentially 
 
 159. Id. at 1233. 
 160. Id. at 1234. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.; see Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540 (2019) (providing that “[e]very person who 
willfully delays or obstructs any public officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge 
any duty of his or her office, is guilty of a misdemeanor”). 
 163. Municipal corporations are persons who can be sued under § 1983. See Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Our analysis of the legislative history 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend 
municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons 
to whom § 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under 
§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is 
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”). 
While cities are not entitled to qualified immunity, they are only liable for the conduct 
of their employees if the employees followed a pattern or practice of violating 
constitutional rights. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Id. at 691 
(finding legislative history did not indicate Congress intended for municipalities to be liable 
under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of employees under respondeat superior theory). 
 164. Koch, 660 F.3d at 1233. 
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also the First Amendment’s right of free speech and the Fifth 
Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. Specifically, if the 
First Amendment’s right not to speak or the Fifth Amendment’s 
right not to be a witness against oneself apply in the context of a 
Terry stop, then this seems to compel the conclusion that a Terry 
detainee cannot, under the Fourth Amendment, be required to 
answer an officer’s questions.165 
Except for the excessive-force claim, which is not directly relevant to 
our inquiry,166 the court then found the same deficiency with each of 
Koch’s claims: that at the time that the officers acted, neither the First, 
Fourth nor Fifth Amendment clearly established the right not to 
answer police questions during a Terry stop.167 In determining whether 
Koch had a clearly established right not to answer, the court asked 
whether a reasonable officer under the specific circumstances of the 
case could have believed Koch was legally obligated to respond to the 
police officer’s questions about the elderly woman’s whereabouts and 
that her refusal “would constitute obstruction.”168 
Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the court cited Hiibel for 
the proposition that law enforcement can compel an individual to 
identify himself during a traffic stop.169 The court noted, however, that 
it is unclear whether law enforcement may impose additional 
requirements upon an individual during a Terry stop.170 Rather than 
attempting to resolve this question on the merits, however, the Koch 
court simply found that ambiguity precluded recovery against the 
arresting officers. In the final sentence of its Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the court stated, “Ms. Koch has pointed to no authority—nor 
could we find any—clearly establishing a right under the Fourth 
 
 165. Id. at 1242 (footnotes omitted). 
 166. Id. at 1246. The excessive force inquiry was not into whether Koch could be 
arrested by the officers but rather into whether the way they conducted the arrest 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The outcome of that claim does not depend on the 
probity of the initial arrest for refusing to reveal the location of the woman within 
Koch’s care. See id. at 1246–47. 
 167. Id. at 1242–46. 
 168. Id. at 1241. The court asserted that the officer’s inability to recall whether he 
knew of the court order precluded the court from factoring the order into the 
probable cause analysis. However, the court still held that “a reasonable officer could 
believe that [the plaintiff] had information regarding [the elderly woman’s] location, 
that under the circumstances [the plaintiff] was required to convey this information, 
and thus that her refusal to do so constituted obstruction.” Id. at 1246. 
 169. Id. at 1243. 
 170. Id. (“[A]lthough Hiibel answered the question of whether an individual may be 
required to provide identification during the course of a Terry stop, the question of 
whether an individual may be required to answer other questions remains unsettled.”). 
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Amendment to refuse to answer an officer’s questions during a Terry 
stop.”171 Without a case directly on point, Koch’s Fourth Amendment 
claim was doomed in the court’s eyes. 
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the court found even less 
support for Koch’s claims. It cited a Tenth Circuit case in which a First 
Amendment right not to cooperate with the police was dismissed on 
the basis of qualified immunity because the plaintiff could point to no 
case clearly establishing such a right.172 Unironically, the court then 
noted that nothing had changed since that case had been decided: 
“[W]e again have found no authority recognizing a First Amendment 
right to refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop. In fact, several 
courts have declined to recognize a First Amendment right not to 
speak in analogous contexts.”173 Rather than establishing a precedent 
that might break the cycle of mystery surrounding the application of 
the First Amendment in the investigatory detention context, the court 
simply kicked the can further down the road. 
Finally, the court rejected Koch’s Fifth Amendment claim. Again, 
the court did not find that the claim was invalid; it simply held that no 
other court had ever upheld such a claim. Citing the Supreme Court’s 
convoluted plurality decision in Chavez v. Martinez174 that the Fifth 
Amendment cannot be violated absent the admission of a coerced 
confession at trial, the court noted that Chavez had left a number of 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1243–44 (“[I]n Albright v. Rodriguez, an officer arrested the plaintiff when 
the plaintiff refused to produce identification in response to officer’s requests. 51 F.3d 
1531, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff sued under § 1983, contending, inter alia, 
that the officer’s actions violated his First Amendment right not to speak. The district 
court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity, but we reversed. We concluded that because we could find no case 
‘recognizing a First Amendment right to refuse to identify one’s self to a police officer 
during a lawful investigative stop,’ any such right under the First Amendment was not 
clearly established and thus the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.” (citation 
omitted)). It is worth noting that Albright predated Hiibel by a decade. 
 173. Id. at 1244 (citing McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887 (M.D.N.C. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom, Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 
636 (4th Cir. 2012)). In McFadyen, the district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that declining to speak to police officers during a criminal investigation raises First 
Amendment concerns. 786 F. Supp. 2d at 949. The district court held that the law 
surrounding this novel issue was not clearly established at the time of the incident and 
that a reasonable officer could not have known that the First Amendment prohibited 
their conduct. Id. The court stressed that protections against government-compelled 
speech during police interviews more accurately falls within the protections of the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Id. 
 174. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
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questions unanswered.175 For example, “the plurality in Chavez 
explicitly declined to decide ‘the precise moment when a “criminal 
case” commences’ for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.”176 As it did when considering the First 
Amendment claim, the court again noted previous Tenth Circuit cases 
that raised a Fifth Amendment right not to speak to the police but in 
which the law had been determined to be unsettled.177 Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that at the time of Koch’s arrest, it was not clearly 
established that an individual has a Fifth Amendment right to refuse 
to answer an officer’s questions during a Terry stop.178 
For each of Koch’s claims, therefore, the court found the absence of 
a case on point to be a sufficient basis for denying recovery with virtually 
no examination of the merits. Although such an approach is certainly 
consistent with the Court’s decision in Pearson—it in fact is the logical 
result of the Court’s flexible approach to order of decision-making—the 
perversity of this outcome should now be clear. The Koch court did not 
treat her claims as novel; it acknowledged that many of these claims 
had been raised previously, both before the court and elsewhere. 
However, the court refused to address them, largely on the basis that no 
court had previously addressed them. As a result, the issues raised by those 
claims were no closer to resolution after Koch than they were before it. 
B.   Alexander v. City of Round Rock 
The Fifth Circuit, citing extensively to Koch, came to a very similar 
conclusion in Alexander v. City of Round Rock.179 Although the facts of 
the case differ significantly from those of Koch, the structure of both 
the questions presented and the means of resolving them are strikingly 
 
 175. Koch, 660 F.3d at 1244–46. 
 176. Id. at 1245 (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766–67). Although the Court would go 
on to discuss arguments made at oral argument, it was clear after its citation to Chavez 
that Koch’s claim was doomed. “Thus, it is unclear in this case whether Officer Beech’s 
conduct potentially violated Ms. Koch’s Fifth Amendment rights, where Ms. Koch’s 
refusal to answer Officer Beech’s questions was used as a basis to arrest her for 
obstruction, but she ultimately was not prosecuted on this charge.” Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1994). 
In Pallottino, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim, but the facts 
were quite different. Decided before Hiibel, Pallottino rejected the plaintiff’s assertion 
that he was wrongfully arrested for failing to give his name to an investigating officer. 
It is now clear that claim is not cognizable. Furthermore, Pallottino is complicated by 
the fact that in addition to refusing to give his name, the plaintiff told the officer “he 
was going to get a bullet in the head.” Id. at 1025. 
 178. Koch, 660 F.3d at 1245. 
 179. 854 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2017). 
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similar. In Alexander, officers observed the plaintiff, Alexander, drive 
into a hotel parking lot, exit his vehicle to briefly walk around, and 
then reenter his vehicle.180 The officers considered this to be suspicious 
activity and flashed their patrol car lights signaling Alexander to stop. 
Upon request, Alexander gave the officers his driver’s license. 
However, when the officers asked him what he was doing, Alexander 
informed them that he would not answer any of their questions.181 
At this point, one of the officers radioed for backup, citing 
“noncompliance.”182 When backup arrived, one of the officers told the 
Alexander to exit his vehicle. Alexander stated that he did not believe he 
was legally required to exit the vehicle and the officers then forcefully 
pulled the plaintiff from his car, with at least three officers piling on top 
of him.183 Once handcuffed, one of the officers asked the plaintiff, “[a]re 
you ready to talk to me now?”184 Alexander again refused, this time using 
an unspecified expletive. The officers then shackled Alexander’s legs, and 
he suffered a number of injuries while restrained. Although an officer 
informed Alexander that they were arresting him under the state’s 
disorderly conduct statute for uttering an expletive where the public 
could hear him, the officer’s police report stated that Alexander was 
arrested for resisting a search and arrest.185 The state did not ultimately 
bring criminal charges against Alexander. 
Alexander then sued the officers and city under § 1983 for violating 
his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court 
dismissed all of his claims, some on the merits, some on the basis of 
qualified immunity, and Alexander appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.186 The appellate court found that Alexander had properly 
pled both that he was seized by the officers without reasonable 
suspicion and that he was subsequently arrested without probable 
cause.187 Central to the latter holding was the fact that the Texas 
obstruction statute cited by the officers as the basis for arrest required 
 
 180. Id. at 301. 
 181. Id. at 302. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a) (West 2019) (“A person commits an 
offense if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer or 
a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at his direction from effecting an 
arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the 
peace officer or another.”). 
 186. Alexander, 854 F.3d at 301. 
 187. Id. at 307. 
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more than passivity in order to provide probable cause.188 The court 
reasoned further that because that reading of the statute was 
longstanding, no reasonable officer could have believed that refusal to 
answer police questioning constituted resistance under the statute.189 
The court based its probable cause determination on the statute, not 
the broader constitutional question of whether one can ever be 
arrested for refusing to answer police questioning. That is, because the 
Texas courts had made clear that some level of physical resistance was 
necessary to make out a violation of the statute, the court was not faced 
with the same question as the Koch court: whether it is constitutional 
to arrest a suspect under a statute that criminalizes refusal to cooperate 
with an ongoing investigation.190 
The constitutional issue was properly raised, however, by the First 
Amendment retaliation claim that Alexander also brought against the 
officers.191 Alexander alleged that his arrest was in retaliation for his 
assertion of his right not to speak to the officers and that it violated his 
constitutional rights for that reason as well.192 This required the 
Alexander court to determine whether the refusal to talk to police 
officers during a Terry stop was protected First Amendment conduct. If 
not, there could be no valid retaliation claim based on that conduct. 
 
 188. § 38.03(a); Alexander, 854 F.3d at 305–07 (“Texas courts have stressed that this 
section ‘applies only to resistance by the use of force.’ Thus, under Texas law, simply 
‘refusing to cooperate with being arrested’ is not sufficient to support an arrest for 
resisting a search—there must be some use of force.” (citation omitted)). 
 189. Id. at 307 (“The plain meaning of Section 38.03(a)’s text and the ample and 
longstanding Texas case law interpreting the statute’s use of force element indicate 
that, absent some physical force directed at a law enforcement official, there can be 
no violation for resisting a search or arrest. It is telling that, in their brief, the 
defendants point to no Texas case interpreting the statute otherwise.”). 
 190. Id. The Oklahoma courts, unlike those in Texas, had made no such limiting 
construction of their statute. Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 
2011) (examining an individual’s refusal to cooperate under Oklahoma law (citing 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540 (2019))). 
 191. The court also concluded, as did the Koch court, that the Fifth Amendment 
does not provide any recourse because Alexander was never charged with a crime. 
Alexander, 854 F.3d at 307 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from being 
coerced into making an incriminating statement, and then having that statement used 
against him at trial. But Alexander was never tried. His Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination was not violated.”); see Koch, 660 F.3d at 1245–46. 
 192. Alexander also alleged that he was arrested in retaliation for using an 
unidentified expletive, but the court found insufficient allegations in his complaint to 
support this claim. Alexander, 854 F.3d at 308. 
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The court cited the Koch decision and an oft-cited district court case193 
for the proposition that the First Amendment has never been held to 
apply to police-citizen interactions. 
We hold that Alexander’s claim on this point cannot overcome the 
officers’ qualified immunity, because “it was not clearly established 
that an individual has a First Amendment right to refuse to answer an 
officer’s questions during a Terry stop.” Surprisingly few courts have 
ruled on this precise issue; the parties point to no cases from this circuit 
directly on point. The sparse case law that does exist, however, indicates 
no consensus that a defendant has a First Amendment right not to 
answer an officer’s questions during a stop like the one at issue here.194 
Alexander’s inability to point to a case indicating that he should 
prevail was sufficient to keep the court from even examining the merits. 
Finally, with regard to the Fifth Amendment claim, the court was, if 
anything, more dismissive. Although it did not cite Chavez, as the Koch 
court did, it simply found the fact that Alexander was never prosecuted 
to be dispositive of the Fifth Amendment claim: “In other words, the 
Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from being coerced into 
making an incriminating statement, and then having that statement 
used against him at trial. But Alexander was never tried. His Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated.”195 In 
one of the few academic commentaries on Alexander, Professor Orin 
Kerr found the court’s Fifth Amendment reasoning, if not incorrect, 
then certainly eye-opening: 
Alexander seems to have invoked his right properly, and at least 
according to the complaint he was punished for doing so. It may be 
that the Fifth Amendment has nothing to say with that: As long as 
Alexander wasn’t prosecuted, maybe the government can retaliate 
against him for not speaking so long as it does so within Fourth 
Amendment bounds in terms of detaining him and using force. 
Maybe the idea that you have a “right to remain silent” is itself 
inaccurate, as you have much more limited rights than such a broad 
phrase would suggest. But my sense is that there are difficult issues 
lurking in the court’s Fifth Amendment ruling that didn’t come out 
in the short passage in the opinion.196 
In sum, the three claims Alexander raised were identical to those 
raised by Koch. However, while the Koch court dismissed all three 
 
 193. Id. at 309 (citing McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887 (M.D.N.C. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom, Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 
636 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
 194. Id. at 308 (quoting Koch, 660 F.3d at 1244). 
 195. Id. at 307. 
 196. Kerr, supra note 46. 
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claims on the ground that the rights alleged were not clearly 
established and therefore could not form the basis of recovery, the 
Alexander court was more willing to at least consider the merits. It found 
the Fourth Amendment claim valid on the basis of Texas’s reading of 
its obstruction statute, found against the Fifth Amendment claim on 
the merits, and then decided that the First Amendment claim was 
insufficiently well established to form a basis for recovery. The court 
found the law there to be well settled not because there was Fifth 
Circuit precedent on point (there was not) but because the underlying 
state law issue was so clear. As we discuss, even if courts insist on 
determining a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity before 
looking to the merits of a plaintiff’s constitutional claim, where states 
clarify that a defendant cannot be arrested for simply refusing to 
answer police questioning, federal courts will strip officers who do so 
of their qualified immunity. 
C.   Kaufman v. Higgs 
In Kaufman v. Higgs,197 which appears to be the only other federal 
appellate case on point, the Tenth Circuit stripped a police officer of 
his qualified immunity for arresting an individual who refused to 
answer any questions. Colorado police officers were investigating a 
minor traffic incident and discovered that one of the cars involved 
belonged to the plaintiff, Kaufman.198 Kaufman voluntarily agreed to 
meet with the investigating officers to discuss the incident, but when 
they would not reveal to him what they already knew about the case, he 
refused to answer any of their questions, citing privilege.199 After 
radioing to a supervisor to report Kaufman’s intransigence, the officers 
arrested Kaufman on charges of obstruction of justice under Colorado 
law.200 Following a now-familiar pattern, the charges were eventually 
dropped, and Kaufman sued the officers alleging violations of his Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the officers 
 
 197. 697 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 198. Id. at 1298. 
 199. Id. It is not entirely clear what Kaufman meant by this. An attorney, Kaufman 
may have been stating that the driver was his client and he could not reveal her 
identity. Alternatively, Kaufman might have been stating that if he were to reveal the 
driver’s identity, it might incriminate him and thus he was invoking his privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. Regardless, the outcome does not appear to 
hinge on the meaning of the phrase in this context. 
 200. Id. at 1299; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-104(1)(a) (2019). 
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summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity,201 and he 
appealed only the Fourth Amendment issue to the court of appeals.202 
After setting forth the facts, the Tenth Circuit described its task as two-
fold: “First, we ask whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Kaufman. If we conclude that probable cause was lacking, we then must 
determine whether Mr. Kaufman’s rights were clearly established, which 
we approach by asking whether the officers arguably had probable 
cause.”203 Although the Kaufman court cited Koch for the proposition 
that the inquiry is in two steps, it is important to remember that that is 
not at all the process that the Koch court actually followed.204 Recall that 
the Koch court concluded simply that Koch was not entitled to relief 
because she could not demonstrate a clearly established right and then 
made no further attempt to determine whether the right existed. The 
Koch court conflated the two in a way that doomed not just Koch’s 
entitlement to relief but the claims of others who would come after her.205 
By contrast, the Kaufman court actually focused first on whether the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Kaufman when they did so. The 
court began by describing the important role that state law plays in the 
adjudication of Fourth Amendment rights. 
[W]e think it prudent to clarify one aspect that might seem 
incongruent—the role played by state law in determining whether 
Plaintiff can show a violation of his federal rights. Here, where the 
context is an alleged false arrest for a purported state offense, state law 
is of inevitable importance. The basic federal constitutional right of 
freedom from arrest without probable cause is undoubtedly clearly 
established by federal cases. But the precise scope of that right 
uniquely depends on the contours of a state’s substantive criminal 
law in this case because the Defendants claim to have had probable 
cause based on a state criminal statute. And as to the interpretation 
of Colorado’s criminal law, other than the statute itself (which we 
 
 201. Kaufman v. Higgs, No. 10-cv-00632-LTB-MEH, 2011 WL 3268346, at *4 (D. Colo. 
July 29, 2011), rev’d, 697 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2012). The trial court concluded that a 
reasonable officer could have believed that the Colorado obstruction statute was violated 
by Kaufman’s silence. As previously discussed, the 10th Circuit came to a very different 
conclusion on that point. Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011). 
Although Koch involved a traffic stop while Kaufman involved a consensual encounter, 
both cases turned on the question of whether a reasonable officer would understand that 
a suspect could not be arrested for failure to answer police questioning. 
 202. Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1298. 
 203. Id. at 1300. 
 204. See Koch, 660 F.3d at 1241 (questioning, for the purposes of a qualified 
immunity inquiry, whether an individual has a clearly established right to not answer 
questions from police officers). 
 205. See, e.g., id. 
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think is quite clear), the Colorado Supreme Court is the ultimate 
authority. So we look to the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions 
when inquiring whether the Defendants’ interpretation of the 
obstruction statute was one that a reasonable officer would have held 
at the time of Mr. Kaufman’s arrest.206 
The Colorado statute under which the police arrested Kaufman 
states that an individual obstructs an officer by force, physical 
interference, or obstacle when that individual knowingly hinders law 
enforcement.207 The Tenth Circuit parsed the statute, concluding that 
Kaufman violated the statute if he presented an obstacle to the officers 
but declining “to read the word ‘obstacle’ to include the most passive 
of all acts—remaining silent—when the other criminal acts [set forth 
in statute] involve active impeding of an officer or his investigation.”208 
The court found Colorado case law confirmed this reading of the 
terms of the statute and noted that the Supreme Court of Colorado 
had interpreted the word “obstacle” to mean more than mere verbal 
opposition.209 From there, the conclusion was straightforward. “The 
only conduct by Mr. Kaufman that is relevant here was a refusal to 
answer questions and an extraordinarily brief explanation for that 
refusal. Because words alone are not enough, it follows a fortiori that 
silence is not enough.”210 
 
 206. Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1300–01 (citation omitted). 
 207. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-104(1)(a) (2019) (“A person commits obstructing a 
peace officer . . . when, by using or threatening to use violence, force, physical 
interference, or an obstacle, such person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the 
enforcement of the penal law or the preservation of the peace by a peace officer, acting 
under color of his or her official authority . . . .”). 
 208. Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1301. 
 209. Id. at 1302 (“Beyond the text of the statute, the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the statute at issue confirms our understanding of the word 
‘obstacle.’ The Colorado Supreme Court has defined the terms “obstacle” or ‘physical 
interference’ in the obstruction statute: ‘The obstacle or physical interference may not 
be merely verbal opposition.’” (quoting Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 810–11 
(Colo. 2005) (en banc))). Interestingly, the trial court had read the Dempsey case as 
creating ambiguity with regard to whether the statute could be violated by mere 
noncooperation. The Dempsey court found that while remonstration against the police 
was itself insufficient, the allegation that the defendant had verbally opposed arrest 
coupled with his walking away and refusing to remove his hands from his pockets could 
satisfy the obstruction statute. 117 P.3d at 811–12. “Unlike the defendant in Dempsey, 
Mr. Kaufman took no action at all, obstructive or otherwise. Mr. Kaufman simply 
refused to speak. Given that Mr. Kaufman could not, under Dempsey, be arrested for 
‘mere[ly] remonstrat[ing],’ Mr. Kaufman most certainly could not be arrested for 
taking the lesser step of declining to speak at all.” Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1302. 
 210. Id. at 1302. 
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Of course, having concluded that the officers had acted in violation 
of Kaufman’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court had more work to 
do. It then turned to the question of arguable probable cause—not 
whether probable cause existed but whether the officers could 
reasonably have believed that probable cause was present.211 The court 
was quite clear on this point. It agreed with the state high court that 
the statute was unambiguous and “clearly established” the Kaufman’s 
rights “[b]ecause no officer could reasonably have thought Mr. 
Kaufman’s silence constituted a criminal act, the Defendants violated 
his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures.”212 
Interestingly, the defendants attempted to turn the holding in Koch 
from a shield into a sword, citing it for the proposition that no 
reasonable officer could have known that it was unconstitutional to 
arrest an individual for noncompliance with their authority. This 
argument fundamentally misunderstood Koch, however. While it is true 
that Koch, reading Oklahoma law, had found no precedent sufficiently on 
point to clearly establish a right not to be arrested for silence, that finding 
is irrelevant to whether the right not to be established for maintaining 
silence was clearly established under Colorado law.213 The Tenth Circuit 
held accordingly and remanded the case to the district court for trial. 
* * * 
Although there are significant doctrinal questions regarding 
whether the First or Fifth Amendment prohibits arrest for refusal to 
answer questions during a Terry stop,214 we argue in this Article that 
that right is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment. Even if 
the Supreme Court has not yet so held explicitly, it has a long history—
in dicta, concurrences, and elsewhere—of presuming such a right. Yet, 
we were unable to find a single case in the lower federal courts finding 
such a right to be clearly established under federal law. To be clear, no 
court rejected outright the existence of such a right. Rather they either 
found that the right was not clearly established or relied on statutory 
 
 211. Id. at 1302–04. 
 212. Id. at 1302. 
 213. The court of appeals distinguished Koch on other grounds. It said that the 
questions the officers asked in Koch—about the location of the elderly woman—were likely 
to lead to incriminating statements and that Koch, unlike Kaufman, was seized at the time 
he was subject to police questioning. In our opinion, the fact that the two cases analyzed 
the law of two different states is a far better basis on which to distinguish the two. Id. at 
1302–04 (contrasting Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 214. See supra Section I.A. 
960 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:915 
interpretation to avoid reaching the broader constitutional 
question.215 The three principal cases discussed in this section—Koch, 
Kaufman, and Alexander—all illustrate the disconnect between the 
constitutional principle and the way the lower courts have evaluated 
these claims. Based on the way these courts resolved these cases, we 
propose three solutions for bringing constitutional principle and the 
reality of constitutional tort litigation into closer alignment. 
III.    PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This Article proposes a three-part solution directed at the question 
of whether law enforcement can arrest an individual who refuses to 
answer questions during a Terry stop. First, as many justices have made 
clear, the “dicta” of Berkemer, along with Justice White’s concurrence in 
Terry, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Kolender, and a number of other 
opinions together constitute the kind of “strong dicta that the legal 
community typically takes as a statement of the law.”216 Together, these 
opinions make clear that, but for a narrow exception created in Hiibel, 
it has long been obvious that one cannot suffer negative consequences 
for refusing to comply with a police investigation. 
For this reason, lower federal courts should acknowledge that the 
law on this point is clearly established and should impose liability 
under § 1983 when officers act in violation of it. This is the simplest 
and most straightforward solution to the problem identified in this 
Article. It acknowledges what the law is, that it has been that way for 
decades, and that when officers fail to follow this clearly established 
law, they are obligated to compensate those whose rights they have 
violated. To those concerned about the chilling effect such a finding 
might have on officers’ exercise of discretion, it should be borne in 
mind that nearly all law enforcement officers are indemnified by their 
 
 215. We do not argue that courts should decide the constitutional issue if it is clear 
as a matter of state law that one cannot be arrested for refusing to answer police 
questioning. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance says otherwise. See, e.g., Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“[W]hen deciding which of two plausible 
statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of 
its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other 
should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular 
litigant before the Court.”). 
 216. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 198 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of references, and of clear 
explicit statements—means that the Court’s statement in Berkemer, while technically 
dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement 
of the law. And that law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.”). 
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employers for constitutional violations the officers might commit.217 
Currently, the victims of unconstitutional arrest bear the cost of that 
injury alone; if courts were to find a clearly established right not to 
answer police questions, that cost would be borne by the municipalities 
employing the arresting officers rather than by the officers themselves. 
Placing the burden with those best able to avoid the harm seems more 
equitable and creates significant incentives for municipalities to 
educate their officers regarding the permissible scope of a Terry stop. 
Second, to the extent that courts conclude that the law on this point 
is ambiguous, they should resolve that ambiguity by finding that there 
is a Fourth Amendment right not to answer police questions during a 
Terry stop.218 When a court admits ambiguity in precedent but chooses 
to resolve that ambiguity in the case before it, it will likely find that the 
officers in that case are entitled to qualified immunity, even if they find 
for a plaintiff on the merits. Although we do not believe that the law is 
currently ambiguous, we acknowledge that a court that does find it 
ambiguous should grant qualified immunity to the defendants in the case 
before it; the court’s decision will clarify the law but only for future actors. 
Obviously, from the perspective of those alleging a constitutional 
violation, this is a second-best option to the first. The plaintiff bringing 
such a claim is no better off financially than she was prior to suit.219 But 
 
 217. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 495–96 (2011) (stating that most scholars disagree with the 
Supreme Court’s presumption that “that officials, absent immunity, would face the 
threat of personal liability for constitutional violations committed in the ostensible 
performance of their official duties”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912 (2014) (demonstrating that in forty-one jurisdictions between 
2006 and 2011, officers had to contribute financially in only 0.41% of cases that ended 
in plaintiffs’ favor). 
 218. Some critics have written that merits-first adjudication (determining whether 
a right exists before deciding whether that right is clearly established) is far from a 
panacea for constitutional tort plaintiffs. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified 
Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 702 (2009) (arguing 
that while the original rationale behind sequencing was to allow injured plaintiffs to 
recover, data suggest that “no increase in recovery by injured plaintiffs occurred”). But 
see Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 623, 628, 639–40 (2011) (finding that over 45% of the time, courts find for 
plaintiffs on the merits of the constitutional claims and that moving from Saucier to 
Pearson affected little and should not be understood as “an unambiguous victory for 
government official defendants”). 
 219. Given that damages in many of these cases will be nominal—compensating 
plaintiffs for the harm of being wrongfully arrested and held for a short time before 
being released uncharged—the acknowledgment that the officers’ conduct was 
unconstitutional may actually be much of what a plaintiff hopes to accomplish through 
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law enforcement officers will be put on notice by the decision and 
given an opportunity to comport their conduct to the law. If they fail 
to do so, later litigants will recover for their injuries because the 
officers violated their clearly established rights. Even if the law was not 
clear before it certainly will be after the first case is decided. This is the 
process of the law’s elaboration.220 
The Supreme Court has made clear that there is no Article III 
concern with a federal court deciding an issue that may not ultimately 
be applied to the litigants before it.221 For example, in unanimously 
overturning Saucier, the Pearson Court did not state that the merits-first 
order of decision making set forth in Saucier created unconstitutional 
advisory opinions. Rather, it concluded that Saucier’s mandate was 
often an inefficient use of judicial resources.222 The cases discussed 
above, however, principally Koch and Alexander, make clear that without 
an incentive to reach the merits of a constitutional tort case, courts will 
allow the law to ossify.223 In both Koch and Alexander, the courts noted 
that the right to silence in the Terry context had been before them 
 
suit. See generally Fallon, supra note 217, at 483–84 (showing the difficulties in 
establishing a cause of action against federal officials). 
 220. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 139, at 1558–59 (“Failure to articulate the existence 
of the right in case # 1 will provide no guidance to officers and leave the law uncertain 
when case # 2 comes up, and so on. To the extent the law does not become more 
concrete over time, immunity will continue to be available. To the extent cases 
continue to be resolved by finding immunity, the law will continue to remain less 
rather than more concrete.”). 
 221. There are arguments in favor of the constitutionality of the merits-first 
approach. See Jack M. Beerman, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 
S. CT. REV. 139, 154 (2009) (“The argument that Saucier entails advisory opinions 
depends on equating all dicta with advisory opinions, which would call into 
question . . . well-established practices . . . .”). But see Thomas Healy, The Rise of 
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 853 (2005) (“The rise of 
unnecessary constitutional rulings is in significant tension with the long-established 
premises of federal court jurisdiction. In its rejection of advisory opinions, its refusal to 
adjudicate political questions, and its stringent standing requirements, the Supreme Court 
traditionally has rejected the view of federal courts as roving expositors of constitutional 
norms in favor of a dispute resolution model in which the exclusive function of the federal 
courts-—at least at the lower levels-—is to decide cases and controversies.”). 
 222. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–43 (2009). 
 223. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Tort, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 
271 (2000) (“By denying damages to persons injured by discarded past practices, 
qualified immunity reduces the cost of innovation . . . . It enables courts to adopt new 
rules without requiring payment to those who did not benefit from the new rule in the 
past. Without that limitation, the costs of compensation might well prove paralyzing. 
Requiring full remediation for past failure to comply with newly announced rules would 
stifle constitutional innovation and risk rigidity and ossification in constitutional law.”). 
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before and had been found not to be clearly established. Yet, both 
courts left that issue just as ambiguous as it had been before, finding 
simply that ambiguity prevented the plaintiff’s recovery. While it is 
worth remembering that the federal courts’ dockets are crowded, in 
the long run, announcement of constitutional principles may facilitate 
the timely resolution of constitutional tort cases rather than impeding 
such resolution. Without a clear answer, officers do not know what the law 
expects of them and will engage in constitutionally uncertain conduct 
that leads to litigation. With an answer, the metes and bounds of 
constitutional rights will be drawn and there are likely to be fewer such 
cases reaching the courts and occupying their time in the long run. 
Waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve any perceived uncertainty 
is not a viable alternative. The Court takes very few cases each year, and 
that number has only been decreasing in recent years.224 The likelihood 
that the Court will take a case to announce what seemed obvious both 
to the Terry Court fifty years ago and to every Justice who has weighed in 
on the matter since—that one is not obligated to answer police 
questions during a Terry stop—seems extraordinarily unlikely. Moreover, 
the near term is not likely to produce a circuit split that might entice the 
Court to take up this issue. Because courts rarely reach the merits of the 
constitutional issue, there is increasingly little reason to expect a case to 
be ripe for appeal to the Supreme Court any time soon.225 
Finally, we encourage the states, through either statutory amendment 
or state constitutional adjudication, to make clear that their obstruction-
of-justice statutes are not violated by the refusal of a suspect to answer 
 
 224. Federal Judicial Caseloads, 1789–2016, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-caseloads-1880-2015#_ftn1 
[https://perma.cc/MKN5-VALW]. 
 225. The clearly established law requirements of both qualified immunity and the 
exclusionary rule do not require a Supreme Court precedent directly on point. 
Compare, for example, habeas corpus. Like a plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983, a 
habeas petitioner must show that the right he is seeking to enforce was clearly 
established. However, under the federal habeas statute, there is only one source that 
can clearly establish law—the United States Supreme Court. That is, if there is not a 
Supreme Court opinion on point, the law is not clearly established, and a habeas court 
is not permitted to grant relief. Rather, they require controlling law that sufficiently 
guides the behavior of officers in the field such that it is fair to impose a sanction when 
they fail to comply with the law. Contrast that with qualified immunity analysis, wherein 
courts will find a law to be clearly established if (1) there is a binding Supreme Court 
or Circuit Court decision on point; or (2) the clearly established weight of authority 
from other courts has found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains; or (3) the official’s 
conduct was so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the 
total absence of case law. See, e.g., Tenorio v. Pitzer, 802 F.3d 1160, 1163–64, 1174 (10th 
Cir. 2015); Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 979 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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officer questions. As the Court in Hiibel somewhat cryptically wrote, it 
was the Nevada statute, not the Fourth Amendment, that required the 
defendant in that case to identify himself.226 That is, the only reason the 
officers were entitled to arrest Hiibel for failing to identify himself was 
because there was a Nevada statute that authorized them to do so. 
Absent such a statute, the officers would not have been entitled to arrest 
Hiibel for noncompliance. 
As discussed above,227 every state has on its books a statute that 
criminalizes interference with an officer’s execution of her duties. Some 
states have made clear, however, that in order to violate such a statute, a 
defendant must engage in at least some physical conduct. For example, 
as the Kaufman court noted, Colorado has made clear that words alone 
cannot constitute a violation of its obstruction statute. If words cannot 
suffice, surely silence cannot either.228 If other states made that point 
clear, more individuals would be protected from arrest for asserting their 
right not to answer questions put to them by law enforcement. 
Obviously, a statutory solution is less satisfying than a constitutional 
one. It leaves open the question whether, as a general matter, one can 
ever face arrest for failure to answer police questions. Leaving this 
question open can lead to the odd result that an individual like 
Kaufman who lives in Colorado has a clearly established right not to be 
arrested for refusing to answer an officer’s questions, while another 
Tenth Circuit resident, like Koch in Oklahoma, has no such clearly 
established right. 
However, a state law solution is better than none. A state that makes 
clear, either through statute or as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
that refusal to answer police questioning cannot form the basis for 
arrest puts officers on notice. If they choose to arrest despite the clarity 
of state law, they will find themselves liable to constitutional tort suit 
and will be stripped of their qualified immunity. The Supreme Court 
has often said that one’s constitutional rights cannot depend on the 
vagaries of state law.229 For example, in California v. Greenwood,230 police 
officers had a trash collector segregate defendant’s garbage for them 
 
 226. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004) (“The Fourth 
Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions . . . . Here, the source 
of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 227. See supra Part I. 
 228. Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 229. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
299 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As far as I know, the applicability of a provision 
of the Constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law . . . .”). 
 230. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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and then went through it without a warrant.231 The Court rejected 
defendant’s argument that, because the officer’s conduct was 
unconstitutional under state law, the evidence should be suppressed in 
federal court as well. The Court held that while states may read their 
own statutes or constitutions as more restrictive than the federal 
constitution, “[w]e have never intimated . . . that whether or not a 
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
depends on the law of the particular State in which the search 
occurs.”232 Similarly, in Oliver v. United States,233 the Court held that the 
fact that officers were violating a state trespass statute when they came 
onto the defendant’s land to discover his marijuana grow did not 
render the evidence they uncovered inadmissible in federal court.234 
However, where a state makes clear that there is no probable cause 
to arrest for a particular set of facts, officers violate the Fourth 
Amendment when they nonetheless conduct such an arrest. As the 
Court acknowledged in Virginia v. Moore,235 the crucial question when 
determining the reasonableness of an arrest is the existence or absence 
of probable cause.236 In Moore, the defendant was arrested for an 
infraction that, under state law, permitted only the issuance of a 
citation and not a full custodial arrest.237 The Court, nonetheless, 
found that the evidence discovered incident to Moore’s arrest should 
be admitted against him notwithstanding the officer’s failure to follow 
the procedures set forth by state law. In doing so, the Court 
determined that the reasonableness of an arrest is not a question of 
state procedural rules but solely dependent on the existence or 
absence of probable cause.238 While a state cannot change federal 
 
 231. Id. at 37–38. 
 232. Id. at 43. 
 233. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 234. Id. at 183 (“The law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that the 
Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances where 
the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest.”); see also 
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s meaning 
did not change with local law enforcement practices—even practices set by rule. While 
those practices ‘vary from place to place and from time to time,’ Fourth Amendment 
protections are not ‘so variable’ and cannot ‘be made to turn upon such trivialities.’” 
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996))). 
 235. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 236. Id. at 166, 171. 
 237. Id. at 166–67. 
 238. Id. at 178 (“When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed 
a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to 
search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety.”). 
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constitutional law simply by changing its own rules of search and 
seizure, it can clearly impact the power of its own officers to arrest 
through its definition of crimes and infractions. 
CONCLUSION 
A clearly established right to remain silent exists during both 
consensual encounters239 and custodial interrogations.240 There is no 
sensible reason why only those who find themselves between these two 
categories—those who are briefly detained for investigation—should 
be compelled to answer police questions. However, despite a lengthy 
history of Supreme Court dicta supporting a right to remain silent 
during a Terry stop, lower federal courts have generally refused to find 
such a right to be clearly established.241 Instead, courts have repeatedly 
concluded that the law is unclear on this point and as a result, the law 
remains unclear for the next court to conclude the same. 
In this Article, we set forth three solutions to the disconnect between 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the unwillingness of lower 
federal courts to acknowledge the existence of the right to refuse to 
answer police questions. Any one of these solutions would have the effect 
of providing injured plaintiffs with something they currently lack—a 
meaningful way to recover damages when they are arrested for asserting 
their constitutional right to refuse to cooperate with a police investigation. 
 
 239. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw 
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an 
individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer 
some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by 
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. 
Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, 
convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The 
person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may 
decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained 
even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to 
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.”). 
 240. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966) (“[I]f a person in custody is 
to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal 
terms that he has the right to remain silent.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(finding no case announcing such a right); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 
1246 (10th Cir. 2011) (same). 
